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Vietnam' is a nation under renovation. Beginning in 1986,
the Vietnamese Communist Party' ("VCP") initiated a series of
economic reforms to transform Vietnam from a centralized 4 to a
market 5 economy.' The VCP labelled this program of economic,
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1. See JOHN T. MCAUSTER, JR. & PAUL Mus, THE VIETNAMESE AND THEIR REVOLU-
TION 34 (1970)). "'Vietnam did notjust happen: she occupied her territory only at the
price of incessant wars.'" Id. The present state of Vietnam has adopted the name the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and was formed in 1976. Id. at 22. "[The hostilities with
the United States ended in 1973] and on July 2 the two halves of the country were
formally united .... " Id. at 22. "September 2, 1945, the Viet Minh forces recaptured
Hanoi, declared Vietnam's independence, and established the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, with Ho Chi Minh as its President and Minister of Foreign Affairs.... In
1976, Vietnam was reunified under the name of the Social Republic of Vietnam." Viet
V. Le, Vietnamese Re-Education Camps: Do They Vwlate both Traditional and Modern
Vietnamese Criminal Law?, 11 Aruz. J. INr'L & COMP. L. 145, 150 (1994).
2. UNDP HANOI, BRIEFING NOTE ON THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM 2 (July
1994) [hereinafter UNDP REPORT]. "One of the most striking characteristic of today's
Viet Nam is the fact that a communist regime is promoting radical renovation (known
in Vietnamese as "Doi Moi") in their economic strategy." Id.
3. See MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS, VIETNAM AT THE CROSSROADS 19 (1992). "The
Vietnamese Communist Party was founded by Ho Chi Minh in February 1930 in Hong
Kong. The party was a fusion of existing revolutionary groups, its main component
being the Thanh Nien (Revolutionary Youth) association, which had been formed in
1925." Id. The VCP came into power in Vietnam in two stages: 1945-1954 in the
North, and in 1975 in the South. Id. at 18. After unification, the VCP changed its name
from Lao Dong (Vietnam Worker's Party) to the Vietnamese Communist Party. Id. at
22. "The new government held an election for the National Assembly on April 25, 1976
and merged the Worker's Party of North Vietnam and the People's Revolutionary Party
of South Vietnam to form a single Communist Party of Vietnam." Le, supra note 1, at
150.
4. UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. "Following reunification, the Government of
the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam attempted to organize the country's political and
economic system along orthodox Soviet lines." Id.
5. WILIAMS, supra note 3, at 40 (citing Adam Fforde, The Political Economy of
Reform in Vietnam - Some Reflections (Mar. 19, 1991) (paper presented at Harvard
Institute for International Development)). In a market economy, most capital is "con-
trolled by economic units that primarily seek to use it for commercial ends, that is to
buy and sell in markets profitably." Id.
6. F. Gayle Connor, Vietnam: Trading with the Enemy or Investing in the Future?, 25 L.
& POL'Y Bus. 481, 482 (1994).
2095
2096 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:2095
political, and social renewal doi moi.1 The central tenet of doi
moi is rapid industrial growth and development through in-
creased foreign investment.8
In pursuit of the objectives of doi moi, the VCP has proposed
legislation that establishes a legal framework attractive to foreign
investors.9 Vietnam's National Assembly ° has enacted basic laws
on tax, property, and exploitation of natural resources.11 In the
most recent legislation under doi moi, the National Assembly
After more than a decade of failed economic policies, Hanoi, following the
example of Soviet glasnost and perestroika, embarked upon a course of re-
forms known as doi moi. This process was launched at the Sixth Party Congress
in December of 1986, and involved an ambitious program of shifting the econ-
omy away from central planning while attracting foreign investment to facili-
tate the development of a market economy.
Id.
7. Mark Sidel, Law Reform in Vietnam: The Complex Transition from Socialism and So-
viet Models in Legal Scholarship and Training, 11 PAC. BASIN LJ. 221, 223 (1993). "Struc-
tured and cautious legal reform emerged as a priority in Vietnam in the late 1980s,
shortly after the Vietnamese Communist Party initiated its policy of doi moi, or renova-
tion, in the economic sphere." Id. "This process was launched at the Sixth Party Con-
gress in December 1986 .... Since the congress was to be broadcast live across the
country, the party used it... as a launching pad for doi moi." Connor, supra note 6, at
482.
8. Camellia Ngo, Foreign Investment Promotion: Thailand as a Model for Economic Devel-
opment in Vietnam, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 67, 72 (1992). "The general
purposes behind the enactment of the 1987 [Foreign Investment Law] were to expand
economic cooperation with foreign countries, achieve domestic economic develop-
ment, and step up exports based on effective exploitation of natural resources, man-
power, and other potentialities." Id. "The key features of this program were: (1) dis-
mantling the collective farm system and returning the land to family farming, (2) re-
moving price controls, (3) promoting the private sector, (4) devaluing the currency,
(5) demobilizing the army and reducing subsidies to state enterprises, (6) revising in-
terest rates to fight inflation, and (7) encouraging foreign investment." James Taylor,
Jr., Vietnam: The Current Legal Environment for U.S. Investors, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
469, 469 (1994). "In furtherance of its quest for economic prosperity, the National
Assembly promulgated on December 29, 1987, its Law on Foreign Investment, the first
of a continuing series of reforms to create legal structures conducive to foreign invest-
ment in Vietnam's new private market economy." Robert L. Wunker, The Laws of 'Viet-
nam Affecting Foreign Investment, 28 Ir'L LAw. 363, 364 (1994).
9. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 30. "Many of the laws enacted [by the National As-
sembly] were closely tied to the economic reforms, which had underlined the need to
put in place basic laws on tax, labour and the exploitation of natural resources if Viet-
nam's economic renovation and its efforts to attract foreign investors were to succeed."
Id.
10. UNDP REPORT supra note 2, at 2. "The National Assembly, designated as the
highest representative body of the people, is the only organ with constitutional and
legislative power." Id.
11. See supra note 9 (discussing laws enacted to encourage foreign investment).
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codified existing labor regulations 12 in the Labour Code of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam ("Labor Code"), promulgated on
June 23, 1994.13
The Labor Code creates the requisite environment to at-
tract foreign investment under doi moi, while extending the so-
cialist principles of Vietnam enunciated under the Vietnamese
Constitution14 ("1992 Constitution"). The provisions in the
12. Ho Tien Dung, Finding Your Way, VIETNAM ECON. TIMES, May 1994, at 12, 21
[hereinafter Guide to Hiring Labour]. Existing regulations include: 1) Decree No. 389-
HDBT (Nov. 10, 1990) (Vietnam); 2) Circular No. 03-TT-LB (Apr. 8, 1991) (Vietnam);
3) Decree No. 233-HDBT (June 22, 1990) (Vietnam); 4) Ordinance on Labour Con-
tracts (Aug. 30, 1990) (Vietnam); 5) Circular No. 238-HTDT-VP (May 17, 1991) (Viet-
nam); 6) Decree No. 165-HDBT (May 12, 1992) (Vietnam); 7) Decree on Regulations
of Collective Agreements (Dec. 26, 1992) (Vietnam); 8) Circular No. 19-LDTBXH-TT
(Dec. 31, 1990) (Vietnam); 9) Law on Trade Unions (July 7, 1990) (Vietnam); 10)
Decision No. 242-LDTBXH-QD (May 5, 1992) (Vietnam). Id. "Subscribers should note
that, notwithstanding the provisions of [A]rticle 197 of the Code, the earlier decrees,
regulations and circulars contained in the Section IV remain in force to the extent that
they are not inconsistent with the Code. The Code is largely a reiteration of existing
law." LABOUR CODE OF THE SOcIALIsT REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (Phillips Fox 1994) (Viet-
nam), trans. n., at IV-173 [hereinafter LABOR CODE].
13. LABOR CODE, supra note 12. The Labor Code was the main legislation ad-
dressed by the 395-member parliament, and sparked heated debate both on the floor
of the Assembly and throughout the nation. Nguyen Tri Dung, Controversial Labour Law
goes to Parliament, VIETNAM INv. REv., May 30, 1994, at 1. The current Labor Code,
which consists of seventeen chapters and 202 articles, went through 30 drafts over a
period of three years before enactment. Id. at 12. "During the several past months
widespread debate has taken place in Vietnam over the proposed legislation. People
from all walks of life and from every social strata [participated in the debate], showing a
wide gap in opinion, particularly on articles of the labour code concerning the rights
and duties of labourers and employers." Id. Legislators received input from interests
groups such as employers, the national women's union, and the national trade union.
See Phu Vinh, Labour Disputes, VIETNAM IN. REV., May 9, 1994, at 1 (stating employers
pushed for recognition of employer's association similar to trade union); see Interview
with Nguyen Thi Khanh Tam, Chief of Staff of Vietnamese Women's Union, in Ho Chi
Minh City, Vietnam (August 4, 1994); see also Qouc Vinh, Women's Union Fights for Ex-
panded Role of Female Worker, VIETNAM INv. REV., May 30, 1994, at 1 (reporting that Wo-
men's Union proposed idea to lawmakers and continued to push when the National
Assembly met). Drafts of the code have provoked mixed responses from workers and
employers alike. Nguyen Van Phu, Draft Labour Law Provokes Strong Public Response, VIET-
NAM INv. REV., May 2, 1994, at 1.
14. VIETNAM CONST. (as amended 1992); BURKE & HOWELL, Supra note 18, at 162.
The Vietnamese Constitution was substantially amended in April 1992. Id. "While simi-
lar to the previous constitution of 12/18/80, the new constitution contains subtle
changes reflecting Vietnam's commitment to economic revitalization-'Doi Moi.'
Michael J. Scown, As the Embargo Crumbles, Vietnam Prepares for U.S. Investors, 4J. INT'L
TAX'N 12, 12 (1993). "The 20 new articles of the constitution are concentrated on
Vietnam's economic system, with some changes to the role of the Communist Party in
the government hierarchy." Id. "The new Vietnamese Constitution nominally reduces
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Labor Code that preserve socialist conventions combine with
Vietnam's decentralized legal system 16 to exacerbate the tension
between local institutions 7 threatened by change and the na-
tional government 8 focused on liberal reform.' 9 At the national
level, the VCP proposes laws to encourage foreign investment in
Vietnam. 0 Regional government bodies, however, implement
those laws to accommodate local needs and attitudes."' By toler-
ating interpretation of the Labor Code 2 and other national leg-
islation at the local level inconsistent with the national agenda,
the VCP may impede Vietnam's ability to assume its place in the
the power of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) by enhancing the power of chief
government officials and the National Assembly." Ngo, supra note 8, at 81.
15. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, pmbl., at IV-101. "[T]his Code institutionalizes
the 'renovation' policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam and provides for detailed
implementation of the provisions of the 1992 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam on labour, and its utilization and management." Id.
16. DAVID G. MARK, THE AsIA SOCIETY, VIETNAM STRIVEs To CATCH UP 17 (1995).
Foreign business representatives often discover to their dismay that what they
are told in Hanoi does not correspond to briefings provided by local officials,
and vice versa. Often it is necessary to negotiate agreements at both levels,
then hope that all does not come unstuck in the implementation. Of course,
Vietnam is hardly unique in being unable to find the optimum relationship
between capital, region, and province..
Id.; compare Taylor, supra note 8, at 469 (stating agenda of doi moi) with Prime Minister's
Address to Closing of the National Assembly, BBC Monitoring Service, June 28, 1994, avail-
able in Westiaw, INT-NEWS Database [hereinafter P.M. Address] (describing widespread
corruption at local levels at times part of collective policies).
17. See UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. "[T]iers of People's Committees (local
government) have responsibilities for daily administration at the provincial, city, dis-
trict, and village level." Id.
18. See FREDERICK R. BURKE & DAVID HoWELL, VIETNAM: A LEGAL BRIEF 162 (Baker
& McKenzie and The State Political Publishing House, Hanoi 1993). "The Vietnamese
Communist Party is the prime political force in the country and initiated the recent
major economic and legal reforms." Id.
19. See MARR supra note 16, at 17 (describing less than optimum relationship be-
tween capitol, region, and province in Vietnam). "Foreign business representatives
often discover to their dismay that What they are told in Hanoi does not correspond to
briefings provided by local officials." Id.
20. Ngo, supra note 8, at 68. "Vietnam's recognition of the importance of foreign
investment to the country's economic survival is demonstrated by the enactment of its
current liberal foreign investment law." Id.
21. UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. "[S]uch decentralization provides advan-
tages in flexible responses to local needs." Id.
22. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 12, at IV-105. "Trade unions shall, in conjunc-
tion with State bodies and economic and social organizations, look after and protect
the rights of employees; and inspect and supervise the implementation of the provi-
sions of the Labour Code." Id.
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international marketplace through doi moi.23
This Note examines whether Vietnam's decentralized legal
structure, which allows entrenched local institutions to perpetu-
ate socialist principles and practices when implementing reform
legislation such as the Labor Code, will frustrate Vietnam's trans-
formation to a market economy. Part I introduces the economic
and social forces whose interaction will determine the success of
Vietnam's transition to capitalism. Part II analyzes conflicting
political agendas of the local and national legal institutions of
Vietnam, using the Labor Code as an example of their effect on
the implementation of doi moi legislation. Part III argues that
the national government should amend existing reform meas-
ures to ensure that the Labor Code and other economic legisla-
tion are implemented consistently with the tenets of doi moi.
This Note concludes that unless the national government en-
forces a uniform interpretation of legislation under doi moi con-
sistent with its liberal spirit at all levels of the government, local
self-interest will frustrate Vietnam's opportunity to realize its po-
tential to become an economic center of Asia and a productive
member of the world community.
I. THE POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION
The VCP has initiated economic reform under doi moi that
encourages investment from foreign capital markets.24 The
United States is becoming a major source of foreign investment
in Vietnam, exerting pressure for social and political as well as
economic reform.2 5 Reform legislation employs existing com-
munist institutions, maintaining the existing communist political
23. UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. "Local authorities presently have a consid-
erable degree of autonomy. They have considerable fiscal power and control over state
enterprises .... (A] lack of clarity in decision making has led to frequent confusion
concerning implementation of economic policies." Id. "[Slome government leaders
have already flagged their intention to retain a great deal of administrative discretion,
either in interpreting the laws or by continuing to issue decrees and regulations
designed to update or redefine them according to circumstance." MARR, supra note 16,
at 13.
24. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (describing strategy of increased
foreign investment).
25. Connor supra note 6, at 489. Although U.S. business was restrained by the U.S.
embargo, the United States will enjoy a "certain advantage in the Vietnamese market"
and a "promising trade-based future." Id. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam's reinte-
gration into the world community entailing "political and economic reforms" has finally
come and "is long overdue." Id.
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and social apparatus.26 The legislation contains broadly worded
provisions that allow local institutions the flexibility necessary to
implement economic reform, while retaining social and political
control.27
A. Transformation to Capitalism Under Doi Moi
Vietnam has been in a state of siege for most of the period
since the end of the Second World War.28 After years of French
colonial occupation and Japanese aggression, Vietnam's revolu-
tionary icon, Ho Chi Minh,2 9 effectively organized scattered
revolutionary groups in a nationalist movement under the
League for the Independence of Vietnam, or the Viet Minh."°
Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam's independence on September
2, 1945 after Viet Minh forces captured Hanoi, the French colo-
nial capital.3" Vietnam was not to be unified, however, until
1976, after three decades of civil war and war against France and
26. See Thomas R. Stauch, The United States and Vietnam: Overcoming the Past and
Investing in the Future, 28 INT'L LAw. 995, 1032 (1994) (describing initial approval pro-
cess mandated by the 1987 FIL, required before commencement of any foreign invest-
ment activity as prime example of how maintaining communism through new law and
communist institutions in Vietnam may take precedence over economic development).
"Th[el initial approval process 'affords the government the opportunity to carefully
scrutinize each application, approving only those investments which it decides will im-
prove the economy without undermining the control of the Communist Party.'" Id.
27. Sidel, supra note 7, at 222. "[T]he legal system is being required to serve simul-
taneously as a means of market liberalization and as a continuing tool to maintain the
political authority of the [VCP] and the state apparatus it has created and reinforced."
Id. "A number of laws passed in recent years fail to resolve underlying issues, simply
reserving them for subsequent action when the behavior of individuals, companies, or
groups seems to require it." MAia, supra note 16, at 13.
28. See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 1. The nation of Vietnam was formed through a
period of incessant wars. Id. at 5. China, Japan, France, and Russia as well as the
United States have all attempted to exert influence over Vietnam, with varying degrees
of failure. Id. "The country's former foreign minster, Nguyen Co Thach, when asked
once to comment on Vietnam's close relationship with the Soviet Union, quipped that
it was the only one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Counsel that his
country had not engaged on the battlefield." Id.
29. See STANLEY KARNow, VIETNAM: A HIsToRY 688 (1983). Born Nguyen Tat
Thanh in 1890, Ho Chi Minh ("He Who Enlightens") was the leader of the Vietnamese
communist nationalist movement, fighting the French for nine years, and the first
"President of North Vietnam - the Democratic Republic of Vietnam - from 1945 until
his death in September 1969." Id.
30. Le, supra note 1, at 149. The Vietnamese vigorously resisted French control,
but resistance was scattered until the spring of 1941, when Ho Chi Minh "reorganized
various revolutionary groups to form the League for the Independence of Vietnam,
more commonly known as the 'Viet Minh.'" Id.
31. See supra note I (describing declaration of Vietnam's independence).
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the United States.32
1. The Socialist Republic's Centralized Economy
In 1976, the Vietnam Communist Party adopted its second"3
five-year plan. 4 At the outset of Vietnam's unification, 5 the
VCP applied the Stalinist-derived economic system 36 that had op-
erated in North Vietnam ("North")3 7 to both halves of the coun-
try.A Orthodox Soviet institutions, 9 such as local representative
and executive state organs, comprised the system established
throughout the country.4 °
Under the Stalinist .system, the state controlled the
Vietnamese economy.4" State-owned enterprises exploited the
32. See supra note 1 (discussing Vietnam's unification).
33. See D.R. SARDEsAi, SouTHEAST ASIA; PAST AND PRESENT 293 (3d ed. 1994). "In
December 1976, Vietnam adopted an ambitious second five-year plan. It was termed
second in relation to the first five-year plan for the DRV [Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam] during 1961-66." Id.
34. See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 42. "[T]he Second Five Year Plan (1976-1980),
[was] adopted at the fourth party congress in 1976." Id. "The thrust of the plan,
designed to integrate the two halves of the country, was to leave the richer South con-
centrating on agriculture and the North on Industry." Id. "The hope was that the
countryside would subsidize the economic development of industries in the towns." Id.
35. See id. at 40. "With the end of the war in 1975, Vietnam achieved the national
unity and independence for which hundreds of thousands of lives had been shed in the
preceding three decades." Id.
36. UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. "[T]he Government of the Socialist Repub-
lic of Vietnam attempted to organize the country's political and economic system along
orthodox Soviet lines." Id.
37. See WILLuAS, supra note 3, at 10. On September 2, 1945, the North pro-
claimed its independence as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Id.
38. See id. at 41. "The Stalinist derived economic system that had operated in the
North for some twenty years was rigidly applied over the two halves of the country,
which had not even had trading relations for three decades." Id.
39. See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution Making in the Countries of Former Soviet
Dominance: Current Developments, 23 GA.J. INT'L. & CoMp. L. 155, 159 (1993) (describing
local representative organs as councils or soviets and local executive organs as adminis-
trative agencies' local offices).
40. Stauch, supra note 26, at 1009. "[T]he Communist government in Hanoi
chose to structure its institutions based on the Soviet model of communism and central
planning." Id. "Orthodox Soviet institutions were established throughout the country
in a manner not dissimilar to that used in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s, or China in
the 1950s." WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 42.
41. Stauch, supra note 26, at 1005. "Nonetheless, the Communists of the North
soon crushed the capitalist hopes of South Vietnam when the state took over the entire
economy and put socialist economic institutions into place." Id. "Production was or-
ganized on the basis of detailed plans produced at the center by the State Planning
Commission." WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 44.
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means of production.42 These enterprises followed a centrally
administered system in which the state orchestrated the supply
of raw materials, labor relations, production levels, and budg-
ets.43 By the end of the first decade after unification, however, it
became clear that state had failed to effectively administer the
centrally planned economy.44
As the crisis worsened, state institutions did not perform ac-
cording to the centrally administered guidelines.4' The elabo-
rate state-subsidized economic system broke down.46 The institu-
tions at the local level exercised inordinate power,47 acted inde-
pendently from the centralized administration, 48 and became
corrupt.49 The resulting stagnation of the economy forced the
42. WILLiAMs, supra note 3, at 49. "In 1988, state-owned enterprises still accounted
for over 70% of the country's industrial output." Id.
43. Id. at 44. "There was little in the way of financial discipline, with the require-
ments of enterprises being met out of the state budget." Id.
44. Id. at 43. "At the end of the 1970's the Vietnamese economy faced a very real
crisis.... Behind this failure, there was increasing evidence that, notwithstanding the
monolithic facade of party rule, there was far from uniform control, especially in the
countryside." Id. at 43-44.
45. Id. at 44.
Indeed some observers have argued that, even before 1975, party control of
the economy in the North was far from what was claimed by official propa-
ganda. Although the Soviet-style institutions necessary to create forced eco-
nomic development were in place, the compulsion associated with those insti-
tutions in classic Stalinist policies seems to have been lacking.
Id.
46. Stauch, supra note 26, at 1010. "By the mid-1980's the Vietnamese Govern-
ment, although not willing to admit what the Vietnamese people already knew, began
to realize that their socialist economic model was failing." Id. "The Stalinist command
economy, introduced in the North during the 1950s and justified subsequently by the
exigencies of anti-American armed struggle, was now coming unstuck from below as
well as being questioned from above." MmAx, supra note 16, at 6.
47. Wit-iuAsS, supra note 3, at 30. "Local cadres exercised extraordinary powers in
areas in which they ruled, and resentment against this state of affairs rapidly came to
the surface in the more relaxed atmosphere after 1986." Id.
48. See id. at 43-44.
Behind this failure, there was increasing evidence that, notwithstanding the
monolithic facade of party rule, there was far from uniform control, especially
in the countryside. Indeed some observers have argued that, even before
1975, party control of the economy in the North was far from what was
claimed by official propaganda.
Id. "The de facto independence of many enterprises, not to mention peasants on the
cooperatives, was reigned in." Id. at 45.
49. Id. at 44. "Enterprises and other state agencies sought to exploit the distor-
tions in the pricing system by engaging in the illegal resale of goods and materials
bought at artificially fixed prices." Id.
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VCP into its present stance of reform.50 ,
2. The Move Toward. a Capitalist Economy
The VCP instituted doi moi in 1986 at the sixth party plenum
in an attempt to rejuvenate the country's economy.5 1 By 1989,
the government had removed the remaining mechanisms of cen-
tral planning. 2  The government lifted price controls on most
commodities' 3 and decollectivized agricultural land. 4 Despite
the economic difficulties still facing the country, Western invest-
ment began to flow into Vietnam. 5 Private business started to
grow in the South of Vietnam and soon expanded to the
North.56
3. Economic Opportunities for Foreign Investors
Notwithstanding China,57 Vietnam represents one of the
larger markets in Asia, with a population of seventy-one million
people.58 The Vietnamese population embodies a well-educated
50. Id. at 43. "In view of the stagnation of the northern economy, drastic measures
to stimulate production were clearly called for. The implementation of such measures
proved to be only the initial steps on a road to reform that is transforming the
Vietnamese economy from a centrally planned to a market-oriented system." Id.
.51. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing launching of doi moi in
response to economic failure of centrally planned economy).
52. MARS, supra note 16, at 9. "In 1989... Hanoi took its most decisive steps yet
toward a market economy. The central planning apparatus, which had attempted for
decades to determine inputs and outputs for state economic units, was dismantled ... "
Id. "In 1989 the government effectively removed the last vestiges of central planning. It
did so first of all, as a United Nations report noted, by 'openly and unambiguously
committing itself to tackling monetary and fiscal problems.'" WiLLAMs, supra note 3,
at 52 (quoting UNDP, REPORT ON THE EcONOMy OF REFORM IN VIET NAM, STATE PLAN-
NING COMMITTEE, HANoI (1990)).
53. Sidel, supra note 7, at 221. "[P]rice controls have been lifted on most com-
modities .... " Id.
54. Id. "[A]gricultural land is being decollectivized and then privatized or turned
over to farmers on long-term leases . . . ." Id.
55. WiuismS, supra note 3, at 51. "Despite a pre-industrial structure, inadequate
institutions, stifling bureaucracy and a shortage of qualified personnel, foreign invest-
ment from the West began to trickle into Vietnam in early 1989." Id.
56. Sidel, supra note 7, at 221. "Whole sectors of the economy have been and are
continuing to undergo privatization ... and private business is booming in southern
Vietnam and beginning a rapid expansion in north and central Vietnam." Id.
57. Pat K. Chew, Political Risks and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection and
Predictability, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 615, 616 (1994). "After a distinct cooling-off period fol-
lowing the Tiananmen uprisings in the summer of 1989, U.S. businesses are investing
again in the potentially enormous Chinese market." Id.
58. Taylor, supra note 8, at 470. "With a population of 71 million people, Vietnam
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and highly productive workforce. 59 Vietnam possesses an abun-
dant supply of unexploited natural resources6" and unlocked ag-
ricultural potential.61 Finally, Vietnam comprises a mysterious
and exotic landscape with 3200 kilometers of coastline6" making
the country ideal for a growing tourist industry.63
Opportunities for investment abound in Vietnam. 64 Viet-
nam has received billions of dollars in aid from the IMF and the
World Bank.65 The Vietnamese government plans to use this aid
is one of the largest markets in the Far East outside of China." Id. "Vietnam's popula-
tion, estimated at 71.9 million in 1993, is growing at an average annual rate of 2.2 per
cent." UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
59. Taylor, supra note 8, at 470. "In addition, [Vietnam] has a well educated labor
force and the lowest wage rates of any country in the region. Vietnam has a literacy rate
of eighty-eight percent compared with seventy-four percent in China and ninety-five
percent in the United States." Id.
60. Vietnam's Transition to a Market Economy, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Feb. 15, 1994, at 8,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnam File. "Given Vietnam's endowments, there
is no reason why the economy cannot develop a wide range of export products. In
agriculture, there is considerable room to diversify exports toward marine products,
rubber, nuts, coffee, and tea." Id. "Specifically, the nation possesses an abundance of
petroleum, coal and natural gas.... Vietnam has an abundance of farmland... and is
currently the world's third largest exporter of rice." Stauch, supra note 26, at 1025.
61. See INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, RESEARCH AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF GOATS IN VIETNAM forward (1993). "Until relatively recently, the devel-
opment of animal production has been hampered by the war years and lack of re-
sources. Pig and poultry production, and dairy development are now getting increasing
attention. With goats, despite the wide interest, there has been very limited support for
research and development in Vietnam." Id.
62. UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. "Vietnam stretches along a 3,200 kilometre
section of the South China Sea." Id. "Vietnam boasts 3,200 Kilometre of mostly un-
spoiled coastline." Frederick Balfour, Sufer Country Now? Vietnam Holds a Surfing Con-
test in a Bid to Lure Tourists, FAR E. ECON. REv., Oct. 21, 1993, at 64.
63. Stauch, supra note 26, at 1026. "Furthermore, Vietnam's vast coastal properties
will create opportunities for hotel and resort chains." Id. Ho Chi Minh City Assistant
Mayor, Le Quang Chanh, "sees tourists fanning out to resorts... [at] one of the several
choice spots that will be developed for tourism along Vietnam's breathtaking coastline."
Tom Fox, Come Ye Back to Mandalay, FW, May 16, 1989, at 38, available in Westlaw,
MAGSPLUS Database.
64. David Forman, Vietnam Starts to Roar, Bus. REv. WKL., July 18, 1994, at 60.
The pace of development in Vietnam makes it difficult to ignore the invest-
ment opportunities it offers. Industrial output rose 12.1% in the first four
months of this year. GDP growth was 7.5% last year and 8.3% the year before.
Foreign investment approvals went from about US$750 million in 1990 to an
estimated US$4 billion this year, and the Government has announced plans
for capital investment of US$40 billion by the year 2000. But the Government
has been careful to keep the economy under control, slashing inflation from
almost 500% in the late 1980's to 7% in 1993.
Id.
65. Michael Vatikiotis, Romance Meets Reality, FAR E. ECON. REv., Sept. 22, 1994, at
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to rebuild its infrastructure which has been destroyed by the pas-
sage of time and ravages of war.66 Because Vietnam lacks the
technology and expertise to rebuild itself, it aggressively provides
incentives for foreign investment in infrastructure develop-
ment.
67
B. The Law on Foreign Investment
The Law on Foreign Investment6" ("FIL"), enacted in 1987
and amended in 1990 and 1992, provides general guidelines for
foreign investment. 69 The FIL sets forth permissible investment
vehicles for foreign investment, 70 incorporates protection for
Vietnamese workers, 71 and guarantees investors that their capital
and assets will not be requisitioned or appropriated.72 Still, the
FIL requires further regulations at the national7 and local
72. "No longer fettered by the U.S. embargo, the World Bank, IMF and Asian Develop-
ment Bank (ADB) are disbursing the first tranches of close to US$1 billion in soft loans
they have earmarked for Vietnam." Id. William Branigan, Giving Vietnam the Business,
WASH. Posr, Feb. 14, 1994, at A18. "Some U.S. law firms also hope to get involved in
the legal aspects of development projects worth billions of dollars that Vietnam plans to
implement now that major new loans from the World Bank and other institutions have
started to flow." Id.
66. Ngo, supra note 8, at 82. "The roads and other infrastructure in Vietnam are
poor, particularly in the North, where they were bombed by the Americans and rebuilt
cheaply, if at all, by the Soviets." Id. "Vietnam's ministers are seeking US$8 billion of
foreign capital to build up power, transportation, communications and water supply
systems." Richard Korman, World Projects Hanoi to World: Let's Make a Deal, Engineering
News-Record, Nov. 1, 1993, available in Westlaw, MAGSPLUS Database.
67. Connor, supra note 6, at 482. The Vietnamese government "virtually invited
foreign businesses to return to Vietnam." Id.
68. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam (as amended 1992) (State Political
Publishing House, 1993) [hereinafter FIL]. The FIL is hailed as the "most liberal in-
vestment law in Asia." Ngo, supra note 8, at 67.
69. Sesto E. Vecchi, Vietnam's Bid for Foreign Investment, INT'L CoR'. L., July/Aug.
1992, at 32. The FIL outlines the forms investment can take and basic structure they
require. Id.
70. FIL art. 2 (outlining JV, business cooperation contract, and enterprise with
100% foreign owned capital as vehicles for investment).
71. FIL art. 16. "Vietnamese citizens shall be given priority in the recruitment of
personnel for an enterprise with foreign owned capital.... The rights and obligations
of the Vietnamese employees working in an enterprise with foreign owned capital shall
be provided for in labour contracts." See Circular No. 04/LDTBXH-Tr (March 18,
1993) (Vietnam) (explaining for already existing enterprises, individual labor agree-
ments were required for every employee by Mar. 18, 1994).
72. FIL art. 21. "The capital and assets invested in Vietnam by foreign organiza-
tions or individuals shall not be requisitioned or expropriated through administrative
measures. An enterprise with foreign owned capital shall not be nationalized." Id.
73. See Decree No. 18 CP Regulations in Detail for the Implementation of the Law
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levels74 to flesh out issues the National Assembly left unresolved.
The Vietnamese government, through the State Committee
for Cooperation and Investment ("SCCI"), promotes the JV to
foreign investors.75 Ajoint venture ('JV") is a legal entity under
Vietnamese law composed of two or more partners entered into
a business relationship for a specific purpose.76 The JV is the
most common mechanism for foreign investment. 77 Most
emerging markets in formerly communist states utilize the JV as
the primary investment vehicle.78
Under the FIL, the SCCI acts as a guide for the foreign in-
vestor throughout the JV process. 79  The SCCI promotes the
value of a Vietnamese partner as a facilitator in navigating the
laws and policies at the local level.8 0 The SCCI encourages the
on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, art. 1 [hereinafter 18 CP]. Promulgated by the
government, 18 CP "concertizes the Foreign Investment Law and regulates in detail
direct investment operations of foreigners in Vietnam; indirect investment operations
such as international credit, international assistance, etc. are not within the scope of
this Decree." Id.
74. See, e.g., Guideline No. 17/LDVL Guidelines of Some Implemented Work at
the Foreign Invested Enterprises (July 1, 1993) (Vietnam) (promulgated by Ho Chi
Minh People's Committee's Service of Labour, War Invalids, and Social Affairs
("USA"), guidelines touch upon submissions to SCCI and labor relations).
75. See id. arts. 66, 69-70 (granting special tax rates for privileged cases and invest-
ment incentives).
76. JOHN P. KARALIS, INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A PRAcICAL GUIDE § 1.2
(1992). "In a modern joint venture, the parties combine their resources, usually com-
promising capital, knowledge, skill and services, in the conduct of a business venture,
but without necessarily organizing a partnership in the legal sense." Id.
77. Connor, supra note 6, at 483. "The most commonly utilized method to date
has been the joint venture." Id.
Depending on the sector of the economy in which the investment is made, the
scale of capital contribution, the volume of exports, and the nature and dura-
tion of the business, a joint venture enterprise may be exempted by the State
body in charge of foreign investment from payment of profits tax for a maxi-
mum period of two years commencing from the first profit making year and,
further, it may be allowed a fifty (50) per cent reduction of profits tax for a
maximum period of the two successive years. Operating losses incurred by a
joint venture enterprise in any year may be carried forward to the following
year and set off against the profits of that years. Any loss remaining after such
set off may be carried forward on the same basis for up to five successive years.
FIL art. 27.
78. KARALIs, supra note 76, § 7.1. "In Socialist countries, "regulation often encour-
ages or requires joint ventures participation as the means of foreign investment. ..
Id.
79. Ngo supra note 8, at 68. "The rights and responsibilities of the (SCCI] include
providing assistance and guidance in the negotiation and conclusion of contracts...."
Id.
80. Connor, supra note 6, at 483 "In addition to being favored by the State Corn-
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foreign investor to leave labor relationships and the hiring pro-
cess to the Vietnamese partner who can more effectively cooper-
ate with the appropriate government agencies and service orga-
nizations.8 1
The SCCI authorizes the formation of aJV by approving the
JV application s.8  The application must be accompanied by doc-
umentation including the signed JV contract and the JV's char-
ter.83 JV contracts must include the procedure for settlement of
disputes between theJV partners and responsibilities of the part-
ners in the execution of theJV contract.84 The charter of theJV
must contain procedures for labor relations between employer
and employees in the JV.85
C. The Political and Legal Structures Effecting Doi Moi
Vietnam faces the challenge of shaping the future of the
country's economic development under the influence of local
interests and foreign investors.8 6 Investment from U.S. business
increases the stakes of reform, 7 along with the flow of capital.8 8
mittee for Co-operation and Investment, which administers all foreign investments,
joint ventures are particularly popular because a local partner can be indispensable for
resolving local bureaucratic problems." Id.
81. Guide to Hiring Labour, supra note 12, at 21. "In aJV the Vietnamese partner
will often be responsible for overseeing the employee selection process and approving
labour contracts." Id.; cf. Nina Shea & P.H. Mullen, You Can't Do Business as Usual in
Vietnam, AsIAN WALL ST. J., March 7, 1995, at 10 (arguing that U.S. firms should not
delegate hiring, firing, promoting, rewarding, and discipline of its workers to un-
supervised middle-men and local partners, government's labor bureau, or other third
parties).
82. BuRKE & HowELL, supra note 18, at 170. "[T]he State Committee for Coopera-
tion and Investment (the "SCCI") has the responsibility for the regulation and the man-
agement of foreign investment...." Id.
83. See 18 CP art. 20 (stating application forJV submitted to SCCI must include
among other documents; the signed JV contract and the JV's charter).
84. Id. art. 21(6). AJV contract shall contain "[t]he procedure for settlement of
disputes between the joint venture partners, arbitration body and the applicable law in
cases of disputes." Id.
85. Id. art. 22(9). The charter of theJV shall contain items on "[I] abor relations in
the joint venture." Id.
86. MAS, supra note 16, at 21. "At a deeper level, Vietnam faces a problem of new
economic interests at work within an outdated political structure. While these new in-
terests may well remold the structure to their taste, the process will take time and entail
not a few dislocations en route." Id.
87. Shea & Mullen, supra note 81, at 10. "Since trade is emerging as the common
language of both governments, it will become the responsibility of the business commu-
nity to reaffirm for Vietnam - and all of Asia - the high value the American people place
on religious and other democratic freedoms." Id. "The lifting of that embargo would
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The national government has promulgated broadly drafted laws
to further doi moi, while entrenching local institutions sympa-
thetic to the VCP.89 The decentralized nature of Vietnam's
political structure empowers local institutions to interpret na-
tional law in their communities thereby affecting the efficacy of
reform.90
1. Foreign Investment: U.S. Investment
Vietnam and the Unites States are forming a new relation-
ship.91 At the urging of the U.S. Senate, U.S. President Bill Clin-
ton lifted the U.S. trade embargo9" by executive order on Febru-
ary 3, 1994.13 For the last two decades the United States has ex-
not only have an almost immediate effect on Vietnam, but would also lock the country's
economic future so tightly into the international economy as to make a retreat into the
Stalinist policies of the past virtually impossible." WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 3.
88. Vietnamese Government Sets Goals for Aggressive Economic Development, INT'L Bus. &
FIN. DAILY (BNA), at D9, Aug. 1, 1994, [hereinafter Aggressive Development). In the first
seven months after "the lifting of the embargo, U.S. firms have embarked on 15
projects worth US$141 million." Id.
89. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing law as tool of VCP for
market liberalization and retention of political control).
90. UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (explaining that local interpretation allows
for responses to specific local needs). "Though provincial governments have been
given more freedom, they haven't passed it on to entrepreneurs. Foreign investors are
welcome, but corruption devours profits." Frank Gibney, Jr., Back in Business, TIME,
Apr. 24, 1995, at 37, 42.
91. Stauch, supra note 26, at 1024. "By lifting the embargo, Clinton put an end to
an era that began almost thirty years ago on May 4, 1964, when the United States im-
posed an embargo on North Vietnam in response to attacks against South Vietnam."
Id.; see Regional Briefing, FAR E. ECON Rv. 13, Apr. 21, 1994, available in Westlaw, FEER
Database. "The U.S. and Vietnam have made progress in their talks on opening liaison
offices in each other's capitals and returning frozen assets. . . ." Id.
92. Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (Supp. V 1993), 31 C.F.R.
§ 500.201 (1992). "As a parting shot following the defeat of U.S. backed South Vietnam
and the fall of Saigon in 1975, the White House extended the embargo to cover all of
Vietnam." Stauch, supra note 26, at 995; Peter Furniss, The United States-Vienam Trade
Relationship: Politics and Law in the Process of Normalization, 35 H~Av. INT. LJ. 238, 238
n.1 (1994).
The trade embargo is authorized by the Trading with the Enemy Act... which
provides the President with sweeping powers to control the trade relationship
of the United States with other nations during time of war or national emer-
gency. The trade embargo against Vietnam dates from 1964 when President
Johnson called for sanctions against North Vietnam and was extended to
South Vietnam when the Thieu government fell in 1975.
Id. (citations omitted).
93. Memorandum on Trade with Vietnam, 30 WKLY. COMP. PrEs. Doc. 212 (Feb. 3,
1994). "I hearby direct the Secretary of the Treasury to take all appropriate actions to
authorize prospectively all trade and financial dealings with Vietnam, and the Secretary
1995] OUTSIDE NVESTMENT iN VIETNAM 2109
erted pressure on Vietnam through the politics of isolation. 94
With the end of the embargo, the United States is taking the first
steps toward normal diplomatic and economic relations with its
former enemy.95 The U.S. government can use Most Favored
Nation ("MFN") status as leverage to force concessions by the
Vietnamese government regarding political96 and social9 7 re-
form.98
of Commerce to exempt Vietnam from existing controls implementing the embargo."
Id. "The lifting of the embargo was accompanied by an amendment to, rather than
repeal of, the Foreign Assets Control Regulations as they apply to Vietnam." Connor,
supra note 6, at 488.
94. Stauch, supra note 26, at 1008-09. "Not only was Vietnam isolated from the
U.S. economy but other non-Communist industrialized nations were reluctant to deal
with Vietnam for fear of jeopardizing their own economic trade relations with the
United States." Id.
95. Taylor, supra note 8, at 469. "[T]he United States has not yet normalized rela-
tions with Vietnam .... " Id.
During the Bush administration, a program known as the 'Road Map' to nor-
malization emerged. This entailed a four-step scenario pursuant to which
Vietnam was to sign a Cambodian peace accord, withdraw all military forces
from Cambodia, and resolve all issues relating to prisoners of war or soldiers
missing in action (POW/MIA). In exchange, the United States would re-es-
tablish diplomatic ties, lift the embargo, and at the conclusion of the process,
consider granting most-favored nation status to Vietnam.
Connor, supra note 6, at 486. "[A]ccording to one U.S. Legislator [Sen. Frank H.
Murkowski, R-Ark.], '[w]hen dealing from isolation, we achieve nothing. When dealing
directly, we saw progress.'" Stauch, supra note 26, at 1035-36.
96. Furniss, supra note 92, at 34. "The POW/MIA issue has become a political
powderkeg." Id.
97. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE HUMAN RIbCrrs REPORT 1993, § 2 (1994) [hereinafter
DEP'T. OF STATE REPORT]. The status of workers, free-speech and the right to oppose
the government are noted by the State Department as problem issues. Id. "[T]he Free-
dom House human rights organization calls [Vietnam] 'one of the most repressive
places on earth.'" Shea & Mullen, supra note 81, at 10.
98. Joann Muller, Returning to Vietnam: State Companies Step Up Plans for Scouting,
Research, DETROIT FREE PRESs, Feb. 5, 1994, at 4A. "But Clinton decided Thursday the
U.S. would get more leverage by lifting the embargo." Id. "Today, our challenge is to
shape a policy that promotes these interests most effectively in light of the changes in
the world order and in Vietnam itself." Sen. John F. Kerry [D-Mass.], Trade Can Be
Carrot for Vienam Reform, VIETNAM Bus.J., Sept./Oct. 1993, at 1, 13. "In trying to influ-
ence the policies of a totalitarian government, we must decide which works better, the
carrot or the stick?" Id. But see Shea & Mullen, supra note 81, at 10.
At this critical juncture, the fact that Vietnam can imprison prominent pro-
democracy voices [specifically two well respected Buddhist leaders] who are
the spiritual leaders to millions of Vietnamese Buddhists suggests that the re-
gime believes it has little to fear from U.S. human rights policy. So far, in fact,
Hanoi has not even responded to the administration's repeated queries about
the status of the two Buddhists, leading observers to surmise that the Clinton
Administration has lost all leverage on the human rights issue.
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2. The Vietnamese Communist Party
Under the 1992 Constitution, the VCP is the leading force
of the state and society.9 9 The VCP nominates candidates for
election, influences legislation, and formulates policy for the Na-
tional Assembly and the government. 100 The VCP influences so-
cietal behavior at the local level through its mass organization of
peasants, workers, youth, and women in state institutions.10 1
The VCP does place internal checks on its own use of power,
however, through political and legal means, 10 2 and is required to
operate within the framework of the law under the 1992 Consti-
tution. 103
The VCP has pledged to reform the economy under doi moi
but is also concerned with remaining in control of that re-
form.1' * The VCP expects to realize both its goals of economic
development and political entrenchment through the renova-
tion of the legal system.' 0 5 After the initial implementation of
Id.
99. VIETNAM CONST. 1. "The Republic of Vietnam is a socialist country in which
the Communist Party is the leading force of state and society." Id.
100. Ngo, supra note 8, at 81. "Although it appears that the VCP is gradually ac-
cepting democratic reform, the present governmental structure still permits the VCP to
remain the country's true leader." Id. "The government posts which allegedly share
power with the VCP are filled by VCP members, and 'nothing prevents the VCP from
ensuring the nomination and election of its favored candidates.., to the posts of Prime
Minister or President.'" Harish Meha, Vetnam: A New Era of Sharing Power, Bus. TIMES
(Singapore), May 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnam File. The VCP
no longer solely directs the government, yet its members recently gained roughly half
the seats in the National Assembly. Id. "The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)
guided and directed the government, which therefore was no more than an agency for
the implementation of the party's policies." SARI)Esma, supra note 33, at 289.
101. SARDESAI, supra note 33, at 289. "The VCP also led the society through its
mass organization of peasants, workers, youth, women, and so on. The party func-
tioned at the four levels: central, provincial, district and village." Id.
102. Oskar Weggel, The Vietnamese Communist Party and its Status Under Law, in RuL-
ING COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THEIR STATUS UNDER LAw 411, 412 (Dietrich Andre
Loeber et al. eds., 1986). "Ultimately, the means for checking the Party narrow down to
a few constraints that are mainly political in character - i.e. the opposition of Party
factions, the patience of the population, foreign policy considerations, etc. To a certain
extent, however, there are even legal limitations." Id.
103. VIETNAM CONST. '3.
104. Party Central Committee Advisor Pham Van Dong Interviewed on Renovation, BBC
Monitoring Service,June 15, 1994, at 1, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database. "It is
not our policy to develop just any market economy, but one in accordance with the
socialist orientation with approximate management of a state governed by law." Id..
105. Sidel, supra note 7, at 223. "Because the Communist Party is attempting to
manage Vietnam's economic reform effort and intends to retain firm political control,
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doi moi, the VCP guarded against the democratic unrest exper-
ienced in Europe and in China in 1989 by rejecting moves to-
ward greater pluralism. °6
Notwithstanding the VCP's efforts, the emergence of reform
in the economic sphere under doi moi led to reform in the social
and legal spheres as well.' °7 Even VCP officials have acknowl-
edged the need to increase freedom on the personal level in or-
der to promote economic diversification and liberalization. 108
Nonetheless, the VCP still retains command of institutional
mechanisms of social control.10
9
3. The National Assembly
The National Assembly, the highest legislative body in Viet-
nam, is composed of deputies elected through direct nation-
wide elections." 0 It is empowered under the 1992 Constitution
to make and amend the Constitution and to pass laws. I" The
the legal system is being required to serve simultaneously as a means of market liberali-
zation and as a continuing tool to maintain the political authority of the Party and the
state.apparatus it has created and reinforced." Id. at 221-22.
•106. WILLIAMS, supra note 31 at 32. "Criticism [by the VCP] of the moves in those
countries towards greater democracy and political pluralism was among the strongest
made by any ruling communist party at the time." Id. "The [VCP seventh party] con-
gress reaffirmed its commitment to economic reform, but, shaken by the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe, firmly rejected any idea of political pluralism." Id.
107. Sidel, supra note 7, at 223. Doi moi has engendered pluralism, greater discus-
sion of social issues, and a broader range of increased personal freedoms. Id.
108. Id. "On the one hand, pluralism, greater discussion of social issues, and a
broader range of increased personal freedoms must begin to enter the ordinary lives of
Vietnamese citizens." Id.
109. Id. "The Vietnamese leadership appears united in its commitment to main-
taining domestic political stability and has allowed that deep desire for political stability
to guide and sometimes limit the pace in which pluralism emerges." Id. "Diplomats
believe the communist leadership, which regularly warns about the dangers of "peace-
ful evolution," is fostering a more restrictive political atmosphere to maintain stability as
it presses ahead with economic reforms." Vatikiotis, supra note 65, at 72. In the early
stages of doi moi, Vietnam observed the crisis of international communism in China and
Eastern Europe which along with domestic factors, "contributed to a rigorous applica-
tion of the brakes to the whole reform process" in 1989. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 31.
110. BuRKE & HOWELL, supra note 18, at 162. "The National Assembly is the high-
est legislative authority in Vietnam, and is composed of deputies elected for a five-year
term through direct nation-wide elections .... The National Assembly also elects the
Standing Committee of the National Assembly, the Chairman of the State, and the
Prime Minister." Id.
111. Id. "It [the National Assembly] is the only body empowered to make and
amend the Constitution and to pass laws." Id. "Laws passed by the National Assembly
are promulgated by the President." Id. at 163.
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National Assembly enters session twice a year to pass legislation
and to vote on fundamental external and national policies.112
The National Assembly has recently exerted its indepen-
dence from the VCP, actively debating crucial issues affecting doi
moi.11 VCP leaders have accepted alternative views expressed in
debate, 1 4 but stress the need for unity and collective consen-
sus.115 Even while expressing the openness of doi moi, the VCP
tolerates no right to question the legitimacy of VCP authority.116
4. The Government
The government is the highest executive body in Viet-
nam. 1 7 Before doi moi the country was ruled collectively by a
Council of State"' and a Council of Ministers."' Rule of the
Council of State was by consensus.1 20 Under the 1992 Constitu-
tion, the government is headed by a cabinet led by a Prime Min-
112. Id. at 162. "National Assembly meets approximately twice each year." Tri
Dung, supra note 13, at 12. The Standing Committee of the National Assembly is the
permanent sitting body of the National Assembly. UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
"(The Standing Committee] has the power to present draft laws to the National Assem-
bly and promulgate ordinances." BuRKE & HOWELL, supra note 18, at 163.
113. A Law Unto Themselves, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 1994, at 41 [hereinafter Law
Shortage]. "[D]ebate [in the National Assembly] has become "perky" on occasion." Id.
114. Id. at 41. Statements are made in the Assembly that could have meant prison
sentences a few years ago. Id. "At the same time, they also raised many practical ideas
to supplement and improve the quality of various documents to be presented at the
plenum." Do Muoi Speech to Closing Session of Seventh Party Plenum, BBC Monitoring Ser-
vice, Aug. 19, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database [hereinafter Do Muoi
Speech].
115. Do Muoi Speech, supra note 114. "Unity and unanimity must be based on the
party platform, statute, resolutions, and the state law." Id. "We must preserve unity and
unanimity within the party as if we were preserving the apples of our eyes, as already
advised by Uncle Ho." Id.
116. Law Shortage, supra note 113, at 41. "But there is no right to question the
legitimacy of Communist Party Rule." Id. "Questioning the legitimacy of the
Vietnamese Communist Party or its exclusive vanguard role is not tolerated." DEPT. OF
STATE REPORT, supra note 97, at 9.
117. BuRKE & HOWELL, supra note 18, at 163.
118. SARDEsAI, supra note 33, at 289. "[The Constitution of 1980] gave more au-
thority to a new body, the Council of State which had both legislative and executive
functions." Id.
119. Id. "Parallel to [Council of State] but subordinate in powers was the Council
of Ministers, mostly an administrative body." Id.
120. Id. "[The Council of State] constituted a presidium or collective presidency."
Id. "Ho Chi Minh always abjured any such practice [of personality cults] in the
Vietnamese leadership and instead stressed collective leadership. After his death in
1969, no one individual inherited the mantle of authority." WILLIAMs, supra note 3, at
24.
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ister." The government has the power to promulgate resolu-tions and decrees which posses the force of law. 122
5. The State Committee for Cooperation and Investment
Since 1989, the State Committee for Cooperation and In-
vestment ("SCCI") has been responsible under the authority of
the Prime Minster for the regulation and the management of
foreign investment in the private and public sectors.1 23 The
SCCI is intended as a one-stop agency for handling all applica-
tions for foreign capital investment in Vietnam. 124 The SCCI has
its own chairman and staff, and includes representatives from
various state agencies.12 5 The SCCI is empowered to communi-
cate with the relevant Ministries, State Commissions, and local
People's Committees in respect to all aspects of an investment
project.126
The SCCI has jurisdiction over enterprises with foreign in-
vested capital at every stage of the investment process. 1 7 At the
initial stages of investment, the SCCI may act as a match-maker,
121. BURKE & HOWELL, supra note 18, at 163. "Under the revised Constitution, the
collective leadership of the Council of Ministers is abolished and replaced by a cabinet
type 'Government' led by a Prime Minister." Id.
122. Id. "The Government [which] has the power to promulgate resolutions and
decrees, is accountable to the National Assembly." Id.
123. Id. at 170. "Since 1989, the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment
("SCCI") has responsibility for the regulation and the management of foreign invest-
ment in the private and public sectors, under the authority of the Council of Ministers."
Id.
124. See id. at 170 (portraying SCCI as one stop agency). But see Ngo, supra note 8,
at 94-97 (describing bureaucratic crisis and failings of approval system). At present
applications must be submitted to the appropriate ministry overseeing the particular
Vietnamese partner as well as the SCCI. BuRKE & HOWELL, supra note 18, at 178.
125. BuRKE & HOWELL, supra note 18, at 170. "The SCCI has its own Chairman (of
ministerial status) and staff, and includes representatives of the State Planning Commis-
sion, the State Commission for Science and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign Rela-
tions, the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank, and a number of additional Ministries
and State commissions." Id.
126. FIL (as amended 1992) (State Political Publishing House, 1993) art. 36. "The
State body of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in charge of foreign
investment is vested with the overall responsibility for matters relating to the investment
activities of foreign organizations and individuals in Vietnam." Id.
127. Id. art. 36.
The State body in charge of foreign investment shall have the following pow-
ers and duties.
1. To assist foreign and Vietnamese parties in the negotiation and conclusion
of business cooperation and joint venture contracts.... [A]ssist foreign orga-
nizations and individuals in the establishment in Vietnam of enterprises with
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bringing potential partners together in JVs.1 28 The SCCI ap-
proves the JV contract, and the formation of the JV.129 In all
cases, an application for any form of investment under the FIL
must be filed with the SCCI in Hanoi.1 °
6. People's Committees
Vietnam is divided into administrative units ranging from
neighborhoods to provinces."' Administrative units from the
village level up are administered by the People's Committees
and the People's Councils.1 12 People's Committees are elected
by the People's Councils and headed by Chu tich, or Chair-
men.13 3 The power of the People's Committees at the local level
extends to zoning and foreign investment approval.1 34 Decisions
one hundred (100) per cent foreign owned capital, and assist in the resolution
of all other matters at the request of those organizations and individuals.
2. To consider and approve business cooperation and joint venture contracts,
authorize the establishment, by foreign organizations and individuals, of en-
terprises with one hundred (100) per cent foreign owned capital, and approve
the charters of those enterprises with foreign owned capital.
3. To determine and grant preferential treatment to enterprises with foreign
owned capital and to parties to business cooperation contract[s].
4. To monitor and supervise the performance of business cooperation and
joint venture contracts and the operation of enterprises with one hundred
(100) per cent foreign owned capital.
5. To analyze the economic activities with foreign owned capital.
Id.
128. BURKE & HOWELL, supra note 18, at 176. "Potential Vietnamese partners may
be identified directly by foreign investors, although it is advisable to seek the assistance
of the SCCI (either directly or through the SCCI's Transaction Centers) or the
Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry." Id.
129. FIL art. 36. "The State body in charge of foreign investment shall have the
following powers and duties .... To consider and approve business cooperation and
joint venture contracts .... " Id. "Thejoint venture contract shall become effective and
the joint venture shall have the status of a juridical person from the date of issuance of
the investment license and certification of registration of the charter of the joint ven-
ture." 18 CP art. 24.
130. BuRKE & HOWELL, sura note 18, at 177. "In all cases, an application for any
form of investment under the Law on Foreign Investment must be filed with the SCCI
in Hanoi." Id.
131. Id. at 163. 'Vietnam is divided into administrative units ranging from neigh-
borhoods to provinces." Id.
132. Id. at 163. "Administrative units from the village level up are administered by
the People's Committees and the People's Counsels . . . ." Id.
133. Id. at 163. "People's Committees are elected by the people's Councils and
headed by Chu Tich (Chairman)." Id.
134. Wunker, supra note 8, at 369. "Moreover, the parties (of aJV] must receive
approval by the appropriate People's Committee of the relevant province, city, or spe-
cial zone . . . ." Id.
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of People's Committees, especially in metropolitan centers such
as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, affect the success of investments
and the resolution of disputes by withholding approval and
through contrary interpretation of law.13 5
7. The National Trade Union
The national government has invigorated trade unions13 6 as
a tool for regulation of enterprises, implementation of policy,
and protection of workers.1 37 Labor advocates complain that
due to high unemployment, employers are free to exploit em-
ployees.13 8 The role of trade unions, the right to strike, and the
collective labor agreement in individual enterprises balance the
bargaining power of the two sides.13 9 Under the new law, work-
ers have the right to organize and be represented by the em-
ployee's representatives or representatives of the enterprise's
trade union in every business that employs more than ten work-
ers.' 4 ° The national trade union, the General Federation of La-
135. Vatikiotis, supra note 65, at 72. The People's Committee in Ho Chi Minh City
forced an investor to remove the top five stories of new luxury high rise office complex,
after zoning changed, even though the investor received approval by the Ministry of
Construction in Hanoi for the later problematic height before beginning construction.
Id.
136. BuRKE & HowELL, supra note 18, at 213. "Vietnamese employees have the
right to form or join a trade union (which is a state organization)." Id.
137. Striking a Balance: Interview with Trade Union President Nguyen Van Tu, VETNAM
ECON. TIMES, May 1994, at 24 [hereinafter Striking a Balance]. "Trade Unions will be
strengthened so as to protect employees rights and benefits." Id.
138. See Vu Oanh Says Unemployment "Beyond Limit for Public Security", BBC Monitor-
ing Service, May 23, 1994, available in Westlaw, INT-NEWS Database (excerpting article
written by VCP politburo member Vu Oanh reporting unemployment is serious con-
cern of government in Vietnam).
139. See Minh Anh, Statute to Create More Roles for Labour Unions, VIETNAM INv. REV.,
June 6-13, 1994, at 1. "With regard to the tasks, powers and functions of the trade
union, the Statute stipulates that the organization has the duty to defend the lawful
rights and interests of workers, and represent them in the settlement of questions bear-
ing on the relationship between labourer and employer." Id.; see also LABOR CODE,
supra note 12, arts. 153-55, 157-79, at VI-156-66. But see DEPT. OF STATE REPORT, supra
note 97, § 6(a) (characterizing trade unions as extensions of the VCP and representa-
tive of workers).
140. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 45(1)(a), at IV-119. "The representative of
the labour collective shall be the executive committee of the trade union of the enter-
prise or a temporary trade union organization." Id. "The new law will require that
every joint venture or 100-per-cent foreign owned company with 11 or more workers
establish a trade union." Dana Sachs, Labour Laws: Part 8 of Our Ongoing Investment
Series, VIETNAM INV. REv., Nov. 22, 1993, at 14.
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bour, 14 1 plans to further its goals of reform through organization
and representation of workers at the local level.1 42
II. CONFLICT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LABOR CODE
IN TRANSITION
Local institutions have been autonomous since their incep-
tion.t4 3 Lack of a formalized legal structure has created a tradi-
tion of improvised dispute resolution and ad hoc problem solv-
ing.1" National exercise of power, emerging pluralism, and the
popular support for continued reform threaten the autonomy of
local institutions.14 During Vietnam's transition local institu-
tions have interpreted broadly drafted laws14 6 to strengthen their
power base and to further regional goals. 47 This exercise of ar-
bitrary power at the local level exacerbates existing discrepancies
between national law and local practice. 48
141. Interview with Hoang Thi Khanh, Vice President General Confederation of
Labour, President of Ho Chi Minh City Confederation of Labour, in Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam (Aug. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Hoang Interview]. The General Confederation of
Labour is the national trade union and represents all workers throughout the country.
Id.
142. Striking a Balance, supra note 137, at 24. "[O]ur plan is that we shall set up
trade unions in every enterprise with foreign invested capital." Id.
143. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing failure of centrally ad-
ministered system to effectively administrate and the resulting autonomy of local institu-
tions).
144. Weggel, supra note 102, at 412. "[I]t is evident that there is a lack of formal
law which is compensated for by improvisations and ad hoc judgements." Id.
145. Courts of Public Opinion, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1995, at 39. The Police are a
good example of an institution in such crisis, as public opinion, after years of perceiving
an abuse of power by police authorities, demands reform. Id. For example, at the trial
of a police officer accused of robbing and slaying a young man, stone-throwers showed
"their disapproval not only of Mr. Tung Duong and the police in general but of the
wider misuse of authority." Id.
What stirs public anger is the manner in which many party and government
officials use their privileged political positions to gain the inside track in new
economic deals, quickly accumulating fortunes (by Vietnamese standards),
flaunting their wealth before less fortunate compatriots, and constructing a
web of connections as defense against competitors.
MARR, supra note 16, at 13.
146. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing VCP's use of law to pro-
mote economic development while entrenching its political control).
147. MmAR, supra note 16, at 19. "Provincial, city, and district administrations con-
stantly look for ways to retain and perhaps expand their political space." Id.
148. Id. at 18.
If a locality disagrees with a major policy, it usually does not voice this opinion
openly or directly, for fear of having its patriotism called into question. The
preferred response is to agree with the policy formally and then proceed to
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A. Conflict in the Legal System and Doi Moi
The legal system in Vietnam is currently in crisis. 14 9 Over
the last eight years, the government of Vietnam has actively re-
formed its legal system and the organization of Vietnam's legal
institutions. 15 0 With the new constitution, over 100 sets of laws
and thousands of legal documents at the governmental and min-
isterial level. 15 1 While this activity is praised by commentators,
152
these general laws are unsupported by specific guidelines'53 and
redress of grievances is limited for aggrieved parties.'5 4 Corrup-
tion and disregard of law and regulations is common at the local
level of government. 55 Bribery is considered the only legitimate
apply it selectively, evade it, or quietly obstruct it, preferably with some ally at
the capital advising on what is feasible at any given moment and warning of
any counteraction.
Id.
149. See Hoai Anh, UNDP Aids Legal Reform, VIETNAM INv. REv., May 2, 1994, at 18.
"The Vietnamese government has acknowledged the need for more major reforms in
the legal system." Id.
150. Id.
"Over the last eight years the legal system and the organization of Vietnam's
legal institutions have made a stride forward. A constitution, Qver 100 sets of
laws and thousands of legal documents at the governmental and ministerial
level have been adopted. But these are only modest results of a major task that
we have to fulfil," said Minister [ofJustice] Loc who considered it "inappropri-
ate for Vietnam to imitate the legal models of any foreign country."
Id.
151. Id.
152. See UNDP REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 (praising steps taken toward reform).
153. Law Shortage, supra note 113, at 41. Le Dang Doanh, of Hanoi's Central Insti-
tute of Economic Management "says that many laws 'are words not laws.' . . . [T]he
bankruptcy law has no regulations to support it. The environmental law says that pol-
luters must pay into clean-up fund, but no one seems to know what the payment should
be." Id.
154. Id. "In Paris last year, Lu Van Dat, the architect of the 1987 foreign invest-
ment law, told the International Bar Association that, for investors tangled in a legal
dispute, the only realistic remedy was political intervention." Id.
155. Gibney, supra note 90, at 38. "On a recent visit, Singapore's Senior Minister
Lee Kuan Yew, a Hanoi favorite, complained that investment projects are 'being held to
ransom.'" Id.; see P. M. Address, supra note 16, at 1.
Regrettably, there are indications of lack of serious order and discipline in
state management and of deliberate attempts to act at variance with the law.
[For example, a] number of provincial people's committees have legalized
hundreds of smuggled cars of reduced tax rates at their convenience. Other
provincial people's committees have claimed that their cars should be duty
free because they are gifts. Actually, this is nothing but an attempt to buy cars
and resell them for a profit. In some provinces, customs officials have fixed
motorcycle import fees at their convenience and have collected hundreds of
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and trustworthy alternative in conducting business. 56
Extrajudicial relief is heavily relied upon because the judi-
cial system is in the process of being restructured.157 Legal adju-
dication lacks a system of enforcement for contractual or eco-
nomic disputes.1 58 Recognizing the inadequacies of the judicial
system, the state encourages dispute resolution through arbitra-
tion and negotiation.159 No case law or precedent found in com-
mon law jurisdictions exists to influence resolution of disputes
because of the preference for arbitration and negotiation to re-
solve disputes. 16' Government agencies, such as the SCCI, may
intercede to mediate arbitration.161 Arbitration committees and
the People's Courts serve to resolve disputes when arbitration
and negotiation fail. 161
millions of dong for their agencies. Some provinces have granted import
licenses for explosives at their convenience ....
Id.; see also Law Shortage, supra note 113, at 41; Harish Mehta, Foreign Lawyers Cope With
Uncertainties in Vietnam, SINGAPORE Bus. TIMES, May 19, 1994, at 1; Alex McKinnon, In-
vestment Womies, ViEmTNAM INv. REv., May 9, 1994, at 1.
156. Ngo, supra note 8, at 83. "Many consider bribery the only way to make busi-
ness predictable." Id.
157. Sidel, supra note 7, at 254. "In early 1992 the Supreme People's Court and
the Ministry of Justice struggled for control of management and staffing of provincial
and lower courts in the drafting of a law on the on the organization of the courts." Id.
158. Mehta, supra note 155, at 1. "One problem with the Vietnamese legal system
is that judgments are not always enforced. In theory, a foreign firm can take a
Vietnamese firm to court to resolve a dispute, and may even win its case. But what
happens then is uncertain." Id.
159. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 9, at VI-104. "The State encourages the reso-
lution of labour disputes by way of conciliation and arbitration." Id.
160. Mehta, supra note 155, at 1. "Another problem is precedents. 'They are lack-
ing' says Mr. [Sesto] Vecchi [Partner, Russin & Vecchi, with offices in Hanoi and Ho
Chi Minh City]." Id.
161. 18 CP art. 33. "However, article 33 of the 1993 Regulations specifically em-
powers the SCCI to arbitrate when disputes among members of a joint venture's board
of management arise on issues of business objectives, business planning, and key per-
sonnel that require unanimity of the board of management." Wunker, supra note 8, at
382.
162. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 170, at IV-163.
The resolution procedure for a collective labour dispute shall be as follows:
1. The labour conciliatory council of an enterprise or the labour conciliator
shall commence the resolution procedure within seven (7) days from the date
of receipt of the request for resolution. Both parties to the dispute or their
duly appointed representatives must be present at the conciliation hearing.
2. The labour conciliatory council of the enterprise or the labour conciliator
shall put forward a resolution proposal to the parties for consideration. If
both parties accept the resolution proposal, a settlement agreement shall be
prepared and signed by the parties, and the chairman and secretary of the
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1. The Sovereignty Question
Existing local institutions' autonomy is threatened by the
move towards liberalization, pluralism, and market reform. 163
Reform extends the powers of the national government,164 at the
expense of communist state apparatus.165 Laws, ordinances, and
decrees, issued by the National Assembly and the government,
systemize law on the national level.' 66 This pluralism subjects
autonomous ministries and agencies to national authority and
popular will.' 6 7
2. Countervailing Agendas of National and Local
Levels of Government
The national and the local power structures in Vietnam view
foreign investment as an opportunity. 68 The national govern-
ment is attempting to stabilize and systematize the Vietnamese
law in order to attract foreign investment. 169 The local level in-
labour conciliatory council of the enterprise. Both parties shall have the obli-
gation to carry out the provisions of the settlement agreement.
3. In the event that the conciliation fails, a non-settlement statement outlining
the view of the parties and the council shall be prepared by the labour concili-
atory council or labour conciliator, and be signed by the parties, and the chair-
man and secretary of the council. Either party to the dispute shall have the
right to request the provincial labour arbitration council to resolve the dis-
pute.
Id.
163. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (describing pluralism as threat to
local institutions arbitrary exercise of power for self-interest).
164. Ngo, supra note 8, at 81. "The Constitution strengthen[ed] the power of the
Prime Minister, who can now appoint and dismiss his cabinet; the power of the Presi-
dent, who can..., appoint the ChiefJustice; and the power of the National Assembly,
which is empowered to enact laws and decrees that must pass on the house floor." Id.
165. See id. (explaining extension powers of National Assembly and government
nominally detracts from power of VCP).
166. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating Labor Code is codification
of existing law).
167. Courts of Public Opinion, supra note 145, at 39. " 'This is a warning to people in
authority not to abuse their power .... I think this makes people in government very
nervous ....' Monitoring justice has become a way of protest in Vietnam.' " Id. (quot-
ing witness of demonstration).
168. See MARR, supra note 16, at 5 (discussing opportunity of VCP to retain. power
by striking bargain with populace by allowing population opportunity to. "find new eco-
nomic space" at local level through foreign investment).
169. Valerie Senghor, France Lends a Hand for Legal Overhaul, VIETNAm INv. REv.,
Oct. 10, 1994, at 1. Serge Tchwaruk, president of Total, a French oil company, insists,
" 'e need stability in regulation of business, so there is no change in the game rules
between the beginning and the end of a project." Id.
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stitutions interpret the law so as to realize the benefits of foreign
investment. 170
a. Doi Moi at the National Level
The national government, led by the VCP, advocates a strat-
egy of economic development through increased foreign invest-
ment.171  The VCP is pursuing a strategy of market reform
designed to improve the Gross Domestic Product, 172 increase the
standard of living for its people,173 improve the nation's infra-
structure, 174 and enable Vietnam to enter Asian and global mar-
kets.1 75 This vision of reform requires a large amount of foreign
investment due to a lack of domestic savings.' 7 6
The nature and size of the foreign investment required for
development requires reform in Vietnam's legal system. 177 A sys-
170. BuRKE & HOWELL, supra note 18, at 163. Lower level ministers and agencies
"are empowered to issue circulars and regulations which define the day-to-day applica-
tion of laws and ordinances." Id.
171. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (describing increased foreign in-
vestment as one of key objectives of doi moi).
172. Vietnam's Transition to a Market Economy; II: Growth Prospects, Financing Require-
ments and a Reform Agenda, E. AsiAN EXEC. REP.,Jan. 15, 1994, at 8, available in LEXIS
Library, Vietnam File [hereinafter Transition II]. "Reforms in 1989 brought an initial
surge in output, especially in agriculture and services, and GDP increased 8.0 percent."
Id.
173. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 40. "The move away from centrally planned econ-
omy has led to a modest improvement in the quality of life of most Vietnamese: ration-
ing has virtually disappeared, comparatively cheap consumer goods are abundant, and
for those with money, access to foreign exchange is relatively easy." Id.
174. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing Vietnam's need for
infrastructure development).
175. Forman, supra note 64, at 60. "Most attention has focused on Vietnam since
the late 1980's, when its government launched [doi moi], a program of economic re-
structuring designed to link it with the international economy." Id.; see supra note 8 and
accompanying text (discussing national government's implementation of doi moi, spe-
cifically FIL and other economic legislation, to improve foreign relations and achieve
stable domestic economic development).
176. Transition II, supra note 172, at 8. "The foreign aid financing requirement for
this scenario [of fast paced growth] is US$400-US$600 million a year in 1994-1995,
rising to US$1 billion by 1997." Id.
177. Vietnam's Transition to a Market Economy; I: Reform Priorities - Foreign Direct
Investment, E. AsiAN EXEC. REP., December 15, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, Vietnam
File [hereinafter Transition I].
There are, however, additional reforms that will be required to sustain Viet-
nam's transition to an outward-oriented, market economy.
Direct foreign investment (DFI) is important to trade expansion, as the
government [of Vietnam] well knows. DFI is also crucial to the countries in-
dustrial modernization, in addition to being an inflow of capital to supple-
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tematized and stable legal system attracts foreign investors. 78 A
comprehensive and consistent set of laws is an initial step in pro-
viding a predictable investment climate conducive to foreign in-
vestment.1
79
b. Doi Moi at the Local Level
The legislation of doi moi maintains local communist struc-
tures, linking them to continued reform. 8 The local level Peo-
ple's Committees, agencies, individual ministries,' 8 ' and trade
unions concern themselves with immediate regional interests.'
Local institutions react to national encroachment on their au-
tonomy, l a3 anomalies in the labor market, 8 4 regional poverty,
ment the current low level of domestic saving. The main guideline for reform
is decontrol and deregulation. Scope of reform exists at both the approval
level and during the implementation stage.
Id.
178. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing stable legal environ-
ment necessary for foreign investment).
179. John G. Scriven, Joint Venture legislation in Eastern Europe: A Practical Guide, 21
HARv. INT'L L. J. 633, 662 (1980). Countries can create a climate that is more condu-
cive to foreign investment by "provid[ing] the foreign investor with a stable and predict-
able economic environment in which to operate a joint venture." Id; see Ngo, supra
note 8, at 95 (stating bureaucracy is frustrating "Vietnam's [otherwise successful] efforts
to promote simplicity and accessibility in its foreign investment policy).
180. See Ngo, supra note 8, at 94-97 (describing requirement of review of all for-
eign investment by VCP as example of legislation contrary to doi moi in which commu-
nist agenda takes precedence over economic development). "This approval process
affords the Vietnamese government the opportunity to selectively approve only those
foreign-proposed projects which it deems appropriate to the health of the economy
and the maintenance of the communist regime." Id. at 81.
181. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 181, at IV-167. "The Ministry of Labour, War
Invalids, and Social Affairs shall carry out State management of labour in branches and
localities within the country." Id.
182. Vatikiotis, supra note 65, at 72. "'Regulations have become regionalized,
which means added frustration,' says John Dick, a lawyer with the Australian firm
Freehill, Hollingdale and Page." Id.
183. Id. "But efforts to dismantle administrative fiefdoms meet zealous resistance,
especially at the local level." Id.
184. Post-Embargo Employment, SAIGON TIMES, June 16-22, 1994, at 13. With in-
creased foreign investment, there is a growing demand for skilled and unskilled work-
ers. Id. Many Vietnamese, however, are still unemployed. Id. "Each Year H[o] C[hi]
M[inh] City has over 300,000 people in need of ajob." Id. This imbalance has resulted
from the shift from a centralized market to a free market economy. Id. "[T] he labour
market is experiencing a great demand for commercial accountants, marketing officers,
interpreters and executive assistants, etc., but these skills are still not offered in many
training programs." Id. While it has been argued that the market is self-correcting, the
State has taken steps to rectify the situation. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 180(l),
(3), at IV-166-67.
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and an influx of incoming capital.18 5 As a result, local institu-
tional action assumes a competitive, short-term edge regarding
foreign investment.'86
Incidents of graft, corruption, and unfair practices, com-
monplace in the centralized economy, are multiplying with the
transition to a market economy.1 87 Local institutions enjoy
unique positions to further their own agendas because local in-
terpretation plays a large role in the implementation of national
laws. 88 Further, individual bureaucrats can take advantage of
State management of labour encompasses the following:
1. Maintaining the balance of labour supply and demand, and making appro-
piate adjustments where necessary to formulate national policies, plans, or
schemes on labour sources, distribution, and utilization for society as a whole;
3. Establishing and organizing the implementation of national programmes,
relating to employment, migration, establishment of new economic zones, and
overseas Vietnamese workers;
Id.; Vienamese Working for Foreigners, SMAGON TiMES, June 16-22, 1994, at 14. Discordant
wages between foreign companies and local firms have created a rift in the market. Id.
185. Ngo, supra note 8, at 96. "Finally, allowing regional economic entities to inde-
pendently administer foreign investment will undoubtedly foster corruption." Id.
186. See BuRKE & HOWELL, supra note 18, at 180. At the outset of investment, the
JV is favored as the primary investment vehicle, while wholly-owned foreign companies
are not so favored. Id. TheJV enterprise is the most common type of business organiza-
tion utilizing foreign investment found in Nietnam. Id. Wholly owned foreign invest-
ment enterprises were restricted at early stages of doi moi. Id. Foreign workers are
similarly disfavored in that local labor receives preferential status under the law. FIL
art. 16 (as amended 1992) (State Political Publishing House, 1993). "Vietnamese citi-
zens shall be given priority in the recruitment of personnel for an enterprise with for-
eign owned capital." Id.
Where a Vietnamese cannot be recruited for works which require highly tech-
nical or management skills, enterprises, organizations, or individuals shall be
permitted to employ foreign employees provided that the period of employ-
ment is fixed and appropriate training plans and programmes are established
for Vietnamese workers in order to enable early replacement of foreign em-
ployees.
LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 132(1), at IV-148.
187. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (citing examples of corruptive prac-
tices by local institutions and demanding reform); supra note 19 and accompanying
text (discussing discrepancies between law and practice at local level).
188. Ngo, supra note 8, at 96. "With the new economic freedom introduced as
Vietnam moves from a centrally planned to a market economy, these lower level bu-
reaucrats will have greater discretion to recommend a proposal to the State Organ for
approval." Id. "Though the SCCI pledges to rule on investment licen[se] applications
within 30 days, investors are often hamstrung by other ministries ... either before or
after they go through the SCCI. As a result, getting approvals can take anything from
one to three years. And with corruption commonplace, the process can be a costly
one." Vatikiotis, supra, note 65, at 72. SCCI must approve all amendments to JV con-
tracts, as well as the initial investment license. FIL art. 2; 18 CP art. 22.
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positions of authority by demanding tribute, bribes, or otherwise
exercising their powers for personal gain. 189
B. The Implementation of the Labor Code at the Local Level
The foreign investor, encouraged by tax incentives, and the
benefits of having a Vietnamese partner, often chooses the JV as
the vehicle for investment.1 90 When a foreign party forms a JV
with an already existing Vietnamese entity, the Vietnamese part-
ner's workers demand contract termination allowances.' 91 The
new Labor Code leaves regulation and adjudication to resolu-
tion at the local level.' 92 Faced with the failure of the JV, an
unresponsive or biased dispute resolution mechanism, and the
threat of strikes from workers, the foreign investor may ulti-
mately assume the responsibility for payment of contract termi-
nation allowances.1 93
1. The Labor Code
The Labor Code ("Labor Code"), newly legislated by the
National Assembly on June 23, 1994,11 may not resolve key prac-
tical issues that may adversely affect future investment.' 95 The
National Assembly drafts legislation, such as the Labor Code,
broadly.'9 6 The National Assembly codified existing labor law,
189. Id. at 96. "Corruption is more likely to attract lower level bureaucrats because
these officials earn meager incomes compared to the amounts they may gain from ac-
cepting bribes.... Should an investor refuse to comply with a bribery demand, the
official may effectively extinguish the project early in the approval process." Id.
190. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text (outlining process encouraging
investment in JV in Vietnam).
191. Hoang Interview, supra note 141. State enterprises contribute assets to theJV,
during transition workers demand payment of retrenchment or retirement. Id.
192. Tri Dung, supra note 13, at 12. "Facing such a broad range of views, and
anticipating the cantankerous character of National Assembly debate, the [Standing]
Committee has elected to submit the labour code for discussion and general approval
at the Assembly but leave details to be ironed out afterwards and promulgated at a later
date." Id.
193. Hoang Interview, supra note 141. If responsibility for these allowances is not
covered under.JV contract, it is open to negotiation between the two parties. Id.
194. Tina Diaz, Labour Law Passed But Does Not Replace Decree 233!, 3 VIETNAM To-
DAY, No. 3,1994, at 15. "The new Labour Code... will take effect from January 1, 1995
. .. I d.
195. See Tri Dung, supra note 13, at 12 (reporting controversial issues have been
left to be "ironed out at a later date").
196. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 179, at IV-166. Under the Labor Code, power
over strike resolution is granted to the national, reform-minded, legislative body. Id.
"The Standing Committee of the National Assembly shall determine the resolution of
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with additional provisions, in the Labor Code.'9 7
a The Labor Code attempts to protect the interests of workers
as well as the reasonable interests of employers.1 98 Although it
creates an attractive climate for investors, the Labor Code still
incorporates protections for labor.'99 Proponents of the Labor
Code herald its regulations as striking the balance between em-
ployee rights and employer expectations while reflecting the re-
alities of the Vietnamese labor market.200
2. Hiring in the New Regime
As a reiteration of the existing law, the Labor Code does not
change the existing hiring practices. 20 1 The Labor Code allows
an employer to recruit labor directly or through an employment
service organization. °2 Enterprises must comply with proce-
dures of notification and authorization still in effect even when
hiring directly.2 3 An employer must still utilize employee serv-
icing agencies in administration of employees within enter-
prises.2 4
strikes and other labour matters." Id. Power is also granted to the local, conservative,
communist body. Id. art. 177, at IV-166. "The people's court shall have the power to
make the final decision in relation to strikes and collective labour disputes." Id.
197. See supra notes 12 and accompanying text (discussing Labor Code as codifica-
tion of existing labor law).
198. Right to Strike in New Vietnam Labour Code, Reuters Newswire - Far East, May 24,
1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Vietnam File. The Vietnamese govern-
ment has attempted to provide an equal distribution of rights and duties to both the
employer and the employee in the employment relationship created by the Labor
Code. Id.
199. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, pmbl., at IV-101. "The Labour Code protects the
right to work, benefits, and other rights of workers.. .. " Id.; see New Labour Contracts,
ViEmTN. INv. REv., July 12-18 1993, at 1 (quoting Ministry of Labour officials stating
protection of workers is top priority).
200. See, e.g., LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 6, at IV-103. The Labor Code sets
the minimum employee age at 15 years of age. Id. "It is believed that Vietnam has to
officially consider working age as low as 15 years because in reality, many private compa-
nies are employing workers that young. The Vietnamese Labour Federation wants to
protect working children." Nguyen Van Phu, supra note 13, at 1.
201. See supra note 12 (describing Labor Code as reiteration of existing law).
202. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 16(2), at IV-107. "An employer shall have the
right to recruit labor directly or through employment service agencies, and to increase
or reduce the number of employees in accordance with production and business re-
quirements and in compliance with the provisions of the law." Id.
203. Diaz, supra note 194, at 15. "Foreign investors, however, will have to follow
both the new Law and still be required to operate under Decree 233 which in its origi-
nal form is now considered inappropriate." Id.
.204. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 132, at IV-148; see Interview with Ta Thanh,
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3. The Retirement Allowance
Retirement allowance is a social insurance benefit accruing
at the termination of a labor contract.205 The Labor Code re-
quires an employer to pay an employee social insurance al-
lowances. 20 6 Employees are entitled to the payment of this allow-
ance upon the termination of their labor contract after reaching
a specific age or after contributing to a social insurance fund for
over twenty years.20 7 If these requirements are not met, one
lump sum payment is paid at the termination of a contract.208
Vice Director of FOSCO, in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam [hereinafter FOSCO Interview]
(Aug. 4, 1994).
Direct employment, where an employee is not only recruited but also super-
vised and paid solely by the foreign enterprise without participation by a ser-
vice agency, is contemplated under the new law. In the future it may be al-
lowed with approval and notification of local authorities.
Id.; see Interview with Collin White, United Nations Development Project, in Hanoi,
Vietnam (July 2, 1994). In Hanoi, the United Nations Development Project ("UNDP")
has implemented direct employment. Id.
205. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 140, at IV-151.
The State shall stipulate policies on social insurance in order to expand and
improve the material security of an employee, and to stabilize the life of an
employee and his family when the employee falls ill, becomes pregnant, re-
tires, dies, becomes injured in an accident, becomes unemployed, suffers
some unexpected crisis, or suffers from other problems.
Id.
206. Id. art. 141, at IV-151-52.
Compulsory forms of social insurance shall apply to business enterprises which
employ ten (10) or more employees. In these enterprises, the employer and
the employees must make contributions in social insurance funds in accord-
ance with [Alrticle 149 of this Code and the employees shall be entitled to
social insurance benefits and allowances in the event of illness, work-related
accidents and occupational disease, pregnancy retirement and death.
Id.
207. Id. art. 145(1), at IV-153.
1. An employee who satisfies the following criteria in respect of age and pe-
riod of participation in social insurance shall be entitled to pension benefits as
follows:
(a) The retirement age of an employee who has worked in heavy, dangerous,
or toxic jobs, or in regions with harsh conditions, near the border, or on is-
lands, and in a number of special cases determined by the Government shall
be sixty (60) years for a male and fifty five (55) years for a female;
(b) An employee who has paid social insurance contributions for a period of
twenty (20) years or more.
Id.; see Decree No. 43-CP of the Government, Stipulating Temporarily the Social Insur-
ance Regimes (June 22, 1993).
208. LABOR CODE supra note 12, art. 145(3), at IV-153. "An employee who does
not satisfy the requirements stipulated in clauses 1 and 2 of this article for monthly
payment of a pension shall be entitled to a lump sum retirement payment." Id.
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Upon termination, an employee receives the retirement allow-
ance only if the employee received no other allowance, such as
retrenchment allowance, or lump sum payment.2 °9
4. Retrenchment Allowance
Retrenchment allowance 210 is a payment to an employee,
who has been employed for over one year, for the loss of work at
the time a contract is terminated.211 In the case of restructuring
or technological advancement leading to retrenchment, the em-
ployer is responsible to retrain and assign an employee to new
duties instead of terminating that employee.212 The enterprise
must pay the allowance in one lump sum at the termination of a
contract.
2 13
209. Id. art. 147(1), at IV-155. "Provided that no retrenchment allowance or lump
sum payment has been paid to the employee from a social insurance fund, the period
of employment of an employee in State enterprises prior to this Code becoming effec-
tive shall be deemed as a period of contribution to social insurance." Id.
210. See id. arts. 17, 42, at IV-107, IV-118 (mandating payment of retirement allow-
ance). Compare id. art. 145, at IV-154 with id. arts. 17, 42, at IV-107, IV-118. Retrench-
ment allowance differs from retirement allowance in that it is a lump sum payment. Id.
It is paid regardless of age, but only after the employee has worked one year. Id.
Monthly retirement is conditional upon fulfilling the age requirement or years contrib-
uting requirement. Id. art. 145, at IV-154.
211. Id. art. 42(1), at IV-118. "Where the labour contract of an employee who has
been employed in an organization, or with an individual, for at least one year is termi-
nated, the employer must pay such employee a retrenchment allowance equal to the
aggregate amount of half a month's salary for each year of employment plus salary
allowances (if any)." Id. But see id. art. 17(1), at IV-107 (providing retrenchment after
restructuring, if reassignment is not possible).
212. Id. art. 17(1), at IV-107.
Where, as a result of organizational restructuring or technological changes, an
employee who has been employed in the business for a period of one or more
years becomes unemployed, the employer shall have the responsibility to re-
train and assign the employee to another job within the enterprise; if a new
job cannot be created, the employer must pay an allowance for loss of work
equivalent to the aggregate amount of one month's salary for each year of
employment but no less than two months salary.
Id. The amount paid is more than retrenchment under normal conditions. Compare id.
art. 17(1) (aggregate amount of one month's salary per year) with id. art. 42 (aggregate
amount of half month's salary per year).
213. Id. art. 42(1), at IV-1 18.
Where the labour contract of an employee who has been employed in an or-
ganization, or with an individual, for at least one year is terminated, the em-
ployer must pay such employee a retrenchment allowance equal to the aggre-
gate amount of half a month's salary for each year of employment plus salary
allowances (if any).
Id.; see id. art. 17(1), at IV-107 (providing for retrenchment after restructuring, if reas-
1995] OUTSIDE INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM 2127
5. Accounting Procedures for Insurance Funds
Under the new law retirement allowance is paid out of the
fund set up through the stipulated accounting procedure for
every enterprise.2 14 Enterprises must establish a reserve for re-
trenchment allowances in accordance with regular accounting
procedures. 15 The state will contribute to both funds to ensure
adequate coverage for employees. 16
6. Legal Grounds of Responsibility for Contract Termination
Allowances in a Newly-Formed Joint Venture
Responsibility for the payment of termination allowances in
a newJV may be assigned to the foreign partner.21 7 Under Arti-
cle 66 of the Labor Code, the JV is responsible for payment of
allowances, as the new owner. 18 In determining the responsibil-
signment is not possible); Interview with Nguyen Van Son, Chief of Labour and Em-
ployment Department, Department of Labour-War Invalids and Social Affairs of Ho Chi
Minh City, in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (Aug. 5, 1994) [hereinafter LISA Interview]
(explaining procedure for retrenchment).
214. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 149, at IV-155.
1. Social insurance funds shall be established from the following sources:
(a) The employer shall contribute a sum equivalent to fifteen (15) per-
cent of the total balance of the salary fund;
(b) Each employee shall contribute five (5) percent of his wage;
(c) The State shall contribute and assist with additional funds to ensure
the implementation of social insurance for workers.
(d) Other sources.
2. Social insurance funds shall be uniformly managed in accordance with
State financial policies and on the basis of accounting records, and be pro-
tected by the State. The retention and growth of social insurance funds shall
be carried out in accordance with the Provisions of the Government. Id.
Decree 43-CP, § VII, art. 21 (June 22, 1993) (Vietnam).
215. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 17(2), at IV-107. "Business enterprises must
establish a reserve for retrenchment payouts in accordance with the provisions of the
Government in order to ensure that retrenched employees are paid in a timely man-
ner." Id.
216. Id. art. 149(1), at IV-155. "The State shall contribute and assist with addi-
tional funds to ensure the implementation of social insurance for workers." Id.
217. See id. art. 66, at IV-127 (providing that in event of mergers or transfers of
rights of ownership, new employer is responsible for payment of wages and other rights
and interests to employees).
218. Id. art. 66, at IV-127.
In the event that an enterprise merges, divides, or transfers its rights of owner-
ship and management, or right to use its assets, the new employer must be
responsible for payment of wages and other rights and interests to the employ-
ees. In the event that the enterprise becomes bankrupt, all salaries, retrench-
ment allowances, social insurance, and other rights and interests of the em-
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ity of the two partners of the JV, theJV contract and theJV char-
ter cover responsibility of contributions and assumptions of re-
sponsibilities 9 Under Article 31 of the Labor Code, when an
organization changes its structure or its ownership, a new em-
ployer is bound by the employee's labor contract.220 The JV will
be bound by the old contracts of the state employees until new
contracts are negotiated and the old contracts are terminated. 22 1
6. Dispute Resolution in Vietnam
In the case of a JV, the JV contract and JV charter are con-
trolling when a labor dispute arises.2 2 Amendments to the JV
charter require the approval of the JV's board.2 3 Amendments
to the JV contract reached through negotiation by the partners,
require approval of the SCCI.2 24 Issues not covered by the char-
ter or contract, such as financial matters, are open for negotia-
tion between the partners.225 Article 17 of the Labor Code re-
ployees shall be first and foremost liability of the enterprise in order of priority
of payment.
Id. IfJV is found to be a new owner, employees are found to be employees of JV, and
termination allowances are found to be rights and interests under Article 66, the JV
would be responsible for payment. Id.
219. 18 CP art. 21. "A joint venture contract shall contain the following main
items . . . [t]he procedure for the settlement of disputes between the joint venture
partners, arbitration body and applicable law in cases of disputes." Id. "The charter of
the joint venture shall contain the following main items... [l]abor relations in the joint
venture." Id. art. 22.
220. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 31, at IV-112.
In cases where an enterprise merges, divides, or transfers the ownership, man-
agement, or right to use the assets of the enterprise, the new employer shall
continue to be bound by the labour contract of the employee until such time
as both parties can agree on the amendment or termination of the contract,
or can enter into a new labour contract.
Id.
221. See id. art. 31 IV-112. If employee contracts are not terminated before an
enterprise enters aJV, the new owner may be forced to honor labour contracts under
Article 31. Id.
222. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (stating in relevant parts thatJV
contract must include "[tihe procedure for settlement of disputes" and
"[r]esponsibilities of the partners in the execution of the joint venture contract" and
charter must include provisions governing "[lI]abour relations").
223. 18 CP art. 33. "A decision on any of the matters set out below shall be made
by the members of the Board of Management on the principle of unanimity [includ-
ing] [a] mendments and supplements to the charter of the joint venture." Id.
224. Id. art. 25. "Any amendments to the joint venture contract as may be agreed
upon by the joint venture partners shall not become valid until it is approved by the
State Committee for Cooperation and Investment." Id.
225. Hoang Interview, supra note 141. Resolution of disputes depend upon the
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quires that before retrenching any employees, employers must
consult with the trade union of the enterprise. 2 6 If there is disa-
greement between the employer and the trade union, the matter
must be submitted to the local labor office.227
In a dispute between the employer and the employee, the
parties must resolve disputes on social insurance issues in ac-
cordance with the Labor Code dispute resolution provisions. 28
Under Chapter XIV of the Labor Code, a labor dispute is re-
solved through negotiation and arbitration.22 9 The matter may
agreement between the parties, if theJV contract, or charter does not make clear who is
responsible it is open for negotiation. Id.
226. See LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 17(2), at IV-107-08.
In cases where the retrenchment referred to in clause 1 of this article applies
to a number of employees, the employer must publish a list of the employees,
the employer must publish a list of the employees to be retrenched, and on
the basis of business requirements, seniority, skill, family conditions, and other
factors of each employee, the employer shall gradually retrench the employees
provided that the employer shall gradually retrench the employees provided
that the executive committee of the trade union of the enterprise is consulted
in accordance with the procedure stipulated in clause 2 of article 38 of this
Code. An employer shall only be permitted to retrench employees after noti-
fying the labour office.
Id.
227. Id. art. 38(2), at IV-115.
Prior to the termination of a labour contract in accordance with subclauses
(a), (b), and (c) of clause 1 of this article, the employer must discuss and
reach an agreement with the executive committee of the trade union. Where
there is disagreement, both parties must submit a report to the competent
body or organization. After a period of thirty (30) days as from the date the
labour office is notified, the employer shall have the right to make a decision
and be responsible for such a decision. Where the executive committee of the
trade union of the enterprise or the employee disagrees with the decision of
the employer, either party shall have the right to request the resolution of a
labour dispute in accordance with a procedure stipulated by law.
Id.
228. Id. art. 151, at IV-156. "Where a dispute arises between an employee and an
employer on social insurance issues, the parties must resolve the dispute in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter X1V of this Code." Id.
229. Id. art. 158, at IV-158.
A labour dispute shall be resolved on the basis of the following principals:
1. Direct negotiation and conciliation between the disputing parties at the
place where the dispute arises.
2. Conciliation and arbitration on the basis of mutual respect of rights and
benefits, respect of general social benefits, and compliance with the law.
3. A labour dispute must be resolved publicly, objectively, in a timely manner,
using a quick and simple resolution process, and in compliance with the law.
4. The trade union organization of the enterprise and the representative of
the employee must participate in the resolution process of the labour dispute.
2130 FORDHAMINTERNTATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:2095
be resolved by a labor dispute resolution body"3 ° only if either
party refuses to negotiate, the parties fail to resolve the dispute,
or upon the request of a party.2 31 After a dispute goes through
the labor conciliatory committee and the provincial arbitration
committee, the people's court can be requested to resolve the
matter by either party, or the workers may opt to strike.232
The foreign partner must negotiate with the employees or
the Vietnamese partner.233 The foreign partner views the debt
for termination allowances as incurred before the JV is
formed.2 3 4 The trade union, the labor office, the SCCI, and em-
230. Id. art. 168, at IV-162.
The following bodies and organizations shall be vested with the power to re-
solve a collective labour dispute:
1. The labour conciliatory council of an enterprise, or the labour conciliator
of the district labour office in the case of enterprises which do not have a
labour conciliatory council;
2. The provincial labour arbitration council;
3. The peoples court.
Id. "A labour conciliatory council of an enterprise shall be established in enterprises
which employ ten (10) or more employees and shall consist of an equal number of
representatives of the employees and the employer." Id. art. 163, at IV-1 60. "The stand-
ing members of the provincial labour arbitration council shall consist of representatives
of the labour office, the trade union, the employer, and a number of other respected
lawyers, administrators, and social workers of the locality." Id. art. 169(2), at IV-163.
231. Id. art. 159, at IV-159.
A labour dispute shall only be resolved by a labour dispute resolution body or
organization if either party refuses to negotiate; if both parties fail to resolve
the dispute by way of negotiation; or if one or both of the parties lodge a
request for resolution of the labour dispute.
Id.
232. Id. art. 172, at IV-172.
1. Where the labour collective is not satisfied with the decision of the labour
arbitration council, it shall have the right to request the people's court to re-
solve the matter, or to strike.
2. Where the employer is not satisfied with the decision of the labour arbitra-
tion council, the employer shall have the right to request the people's court to
review the decision of the arbitration council. The decision of the employer
to request the people's court to review the decision of the arbitration council
does not affect the right to strike of the labour collective.
Id.
233. See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text (discussing negotiation be-
tween parties regarding issues not covered in allocation of responsibilities of JV con-
tract or labor relations in JV charter).
234. See id. art. 17, at IV-107. The allowance becomes due at the termination of
the labor contract. Id. No legal entity other than the Vietnamese partner enjoys a
labor relationship with the employees at the termination of the contract. See id. art. 26,
at IV-1 10 (explaining labor relationship as established through voluntary commitment).
The allowance is providing for past performance from which the Vietnamese partner
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ployees constitute the arbitration bodies that influence the final
outcome of dispute resolution.2 3 5 From the position of the
Vietnamese laborer, businessman, trade union representative, or
government agency, the allowance is a rightful debt of the JV.23 6
III. THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY MUST PLACE
DOI MOI ABOVE THE MAINTENANCE OF
LOCAL INSTITUTIONS
The leaders of the VCP are aware of the conflict within the
legal system. 237 The conflict is a result of the VCP's efforts to
maintain the communist state apparatus and existing distribu-
tion of social control.238 The local institutions augmenting the
tenets of doi moi are the same institutions empowered under the
new legislation.2 39 The VCP mistakenly trusts local institutions
to entrench the Party's interests, however, these institutions take
advantage of broad grants of power to pursue material gain.24 °
has benefitted. See id. arts. 17, 42, at IV-107, IV-1 18 (providing that retrenchment is due
after one year of working for enterprise and amount is based on years worked for an
enterprise); id. art. 145, at IV-153 (providing that retirement is due after twenty years
contribution to insurance fund or if employee is past retirement age and that amount
due is based on years worked). The JV has not received any benefit because the JV is
not a legal entity in existence during the employment under the old contract. Id.; see
18 CP art. 19 (explaining that JV is formally established upon issuance of investment
license and registration of its charter by SCCI).
235. See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text (outlining procedure for resolv-
ing disputes through arbitration between Vietnamese Partner, foreign partner, and
workers mediated by SCCI, trade union, and labor office).
236. See LAzOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 163, at IV-160. TheJV, and in particular
the foreign partner, is benefiting from the workers' experience within the industry and
is considered better prepared to bear the burden of the debt. See FIL art. 7 (as
amended 1992) (State Political Publishing House, 1993) (allowing Vietnamese partner
to contribute technical knowledge and services as asset to JV). The negotiating team
for the JV may be unsympathetic to the foreign partner. See id. (defining conciliatory
council made up of equal amount of representatives of employees and employer). In a
JV there are at least two parties embodying the employers. FIL art. 6 (stating two par-
ties or more parties may establish joint venture enterprise). The foreign investor can be
represented unevenly. Guide to Hiring Labour, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that in JV
Vietnamese partner will often be responsible for overseeing employee selection process
and approving labor contracts).
237. Vatikiotis, supra note 65, at 72. "The country's top leadership is aware of this,
as it is of most problems facing foreign investors in Vietnam." Id.
238. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing entrenchment of local
institutions through new legislation).
239. See supra notes 23, 155-56, 188-89 and accompanying text (describing local
institution resistance to reform and existence of corruption and self-dealing).
240. See supra notes 143-56 and accompanying text (describing crisis of legal sys-
tem and corruption at local levels of government).
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The VCP must address the arbitrary interpretation of na-
tional laws to suit regional and personal goals.241 Every province
and district interprets legislation differently than or contrary to
the national agenda.242 Because of its instability, Vietnamese law
is systematically ignored by foreign and local businessmen.243
Continued capricious exercises of authority at the local level will
undermine the authority and institutional integrity of new legis-
lation.244
If the legal system is to be utilized as the vehicle of eco-
nomic reform, it cannot be employed as the means of en-
trenching the status quo.245 Unless the national government leg-
islates specific reform legislation and enforces its provisions, the
paths of law and practice will further diverge. 246 Local institu-
tions have proved unreliable as agents of doi moi. Regardless of
their professed loyalty to the VCP, institutional local interests
must be disassociated with the exercise of interpreting the new
economic legislation.
A. Reformulating the Traditional Role of Local Institutions
Within Vietnamese society there is a traditional role for lo-
cal level institutions in the legal system.247 After this role's de-
241. See supra notes 181-89 and accompanying text (stating that local institutions
respond to pressures of transition with self-dealing and short-term goals).
242. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text (discussing regionalization at
local level).
243. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (describing disregard of na-
tional law by local level government and bribery as only trustworthy alternative in con-
ducting business).
244. Ngo, supra note 8, at 96. "A foreign investment law which indirectly fosters
corruptive practices undermines legitimate authority and institutional integrity." Id.
(citing Sesto Vecchi, Operating In Unstructured Legal Environments: The Vietnam Model, E.
AsiAN EXEC. REP., July 1991, available in LEXIS, Intnew Library, Easian File).
245. See Ngo, supra note 8, at 98 (concluding "Vietnam cannot achieve the eco-
nomic successes accomplished by Thailand until Vietnam surrenders the desire to con-
trol economic change which may inadvertently undermine communist political con-
trol").
246. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing crisis in Vietnam in
which law and local practice are incongruous).
247. SARDESAI, supra note 33, at 173.
Each Vietnamese village was a bamboo-fenced, practically autonomous social
entity, governed by a council of village notables, who collected taxes on behalf
of the central government, determined the agrarian chores, and distributed
the rice product among the peasants. They also dispensed justice. ... As the
folk saying had it, 'The laws of the emperor are less than the customs of the
village.'
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struction under French rule,2 "t local institutions were re-estab-
lished with the imposition of Stalinist institutional mechanisms
in the North in 1945 and in the South in 1975.249 Showing their
native resilience, these Vietnamese institutions remained
Vietnamese under their Soviet trappings.25 ° Local institutions
should be revitalized to fulfill their traditional roles, but only if
consistent with the national agenda.251
Local institutions provide flexible responses in a country
with considerable differences in climate, topography, and settle-
ment patterns, as well as difficulties in communication and trans-
portation.252 The needs of the Mekong Delta differ from those
of the northern highlands. Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi re-
quire a higher minimum wage than the rest of the country due
to the increased cost of living in those cities. The national gov-
ernment can legislate domestic issues broadly, leaving details to
Id.
248. Id. "The French broke the village autonomy and its corporate character, sub-
stituted elections for cooperation of council members, instituted regular registration of
births and deaths (resulting in more accurate tax polls than hitherto), and exercised
tighter control over fiscal matters." Id.
249. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing imposition of Soviet-
style institutions at local level).
250. Weggel, supra note 102, at 419.
The VCP formally portrays itself as Leninist, but de facto it behaves for the
most part in an entirely traditional [Vietnamese] manner .... Even if Marxist-
Leninist doctrine were reduced some day to mere verbal ritual, the VCP would
almost certainly survive as an institution to the extent that behind the Leninist
facade a working-style is evolving which is shaped according to traditional -
not Leninist - patterns and which, at best, displays a few coincidental similar-
ities to the Marxist-Leninist canon.
This new breed of "Red Mandarins" is apt to resist any form of legal con-
trol as vigorously as the generations of their traditional predecessors did for
2000 years.
Id.
251. Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in
Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 274, 284 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
"Good institutional arrangements should certainly be entrenched if they can offer firm
protection to democratic liberty and even to the preconditions for economic prosper-
ity." Id.
252. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of local level
interpretation). "Most notable for Vietnam is the long north-south configuration, the
product of eight centuries or more of ethnic Vietnamese migration from the Red River
delta down the central coast and thence into the Mekong delta. This produced a state
with considerable differences of climate, topography, and settlement patterns, together
with obvious problems of transportation and communication." MARR, supra note 16, at
18.
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be clarified at the local level when problems arise.25 3
The national government is equipped to make choices ef-
fecting foreign investment and doi moi. The national govern-
ment of Vietnam is politically and economically effective.254
Vietnamese leaders are cognizant of both the benefits and disad-
vantages of substantial foreign investment. 255 The Vietnamese
government has made definitive choices regarding the size and
structure foreign investment will take in the country. 56
The local institutions must cede their sovereignty in the eco-
nomic sphere to the national government in order to enable
Vietnam to achieve its goals at the international level. Vietnam
is attempting to establish a position in world markets and in the
international political arena. 57 Vietnam must respond to the
fluctuations of international markets. International perception
of Vietnam's reform movement will affect the country's ability to
attract needed economic aid and foreign investment. Disregard
at the local level for national law beneficial to the international
investor undermines the confidence of international lenders
and investors in Vietnam's fledgling market.
The VCP must bring local level institutions in line with the
national agenda. Popular support for doi moi lends legitimacy to
the VCP's exercise of power to subjugate maverick local level in-
stitutions. Local level abuses destabilize the foundations of Viet-
nam's new legal system. Corruption and self-dealing defuse the
VCP's ability to effectively govern and undermines the people's
confidence in the VCP. In order to maintain stability the VCP
must subjugate local institutions to the rule of law and the na-
253. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing advantages to flexibility
on local levels).
254. See, e.g., Wunker, supra note 8, at 382. "It is astonishing not only how quickly
the Government of Vietnam is transforming itself into a market centered economy, but
also how extensively it has created new laws in so many fields to catalyze and facilitate its
economic metamorphosis." Id.
255. MARR, supra note 16, at 11. "More fundamentally, the inflow of foreign capi-
tal provokes sweeping socio-economic and cultural changes, some construed [by the
Vietnamese government] as healthy, some viewed otherwise, but all destabilizing to
households, neighborhoods, provinces, and the nation alike." Id.
256. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (describing incentives for spe-
cific investment and grooming of enterprises for JV partnership).
257. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing entrance into world mar-
kets as goal prompting Vietnam's renovation).
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tional will.25 8
B. The National Government Should Resolve Conflict in the
Labor Code
The Labor Code's regulations grant inordinate discretion-
ary power to local level institutions.2 59 The roles of local institu-
tions as arbiters and mediators should be maintained only if a
uniform interpretation of the Labor Code is established, and the
local institutions are obligated to enforce that interpretation.2 60
The National Government must force local institutions to follow
strict guidelines in order to provide consistent dispute resolu-
tion 261 and protect foreign investors.2 62
1. The National Government Should Amend the Labor Code
Because the Labor Code leaves room for varying interpreta-
tions and empowers local institutions to interpret its provisions,
further guidelines are necessary. The Labor Code should be
amended such that Articles 61, 33, and 17 take into account the
specific circumstances of foreign investment and JV forma-
tion.2 65 The foreign investor should not be forced to renegotiate
the JV contract or collective labor agreements from an unfair
bargaining position.
The amended law should state that upon contract termina-
tion the responsibility of termination allowance does not trans-
fer with ownership of the enterprise.2 6 Alternatively, the law
should provide that a contract is modified and not terminated
when an enterprise is restructured or ownership changes hands.
This allows negotiation for the benefit of both parties but does
258. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing popular criticism of
corrupt institutions and need for reform).
259. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing entrenchment of lo-
cal institutions through legislation).
260. See supra notes 247-58 and accompanying text (discussing traditional role for
local institutions and need for centralization)
261. See supra notes 149-62 (discussing crisis in Vietnam's legal system due to cor-
ruption at the local level and the reliance on local institutions to mediate negotiation of
dispute resolution).
262. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying (describing graft, corruption, and
unfair dealings practiced by local officials at expense of foreign investors).
263. See supra notes 217-27 and accompanying text (describing legal argument for
JV's assumption of termination allowances).
264. See supra notes 218, 220 and accompanying texts (discussing Articles 66 and
31 as mandating continuation of responsibilities to workers with transfer of ownership).
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not place the foreign party at a disadvantage. The law should
indicate if foreign investors are responsible for such payments,
so that those payments can be factored into a prospective inves-
tors cost analysis.
2. The National Government Should Change the
Interpretation of the Labor Code
Because the formation of aJV falls under Article 17, and not
42, retrenchment should not be paid to workers who are still
employed.265 The formation of a JV is a restructuring, which
triggers Article 17. Article 17, like Articles 31 and 66, deals spe-
cifically with the continuity of employment for workers. If after a
year of employment, an employee's position is terminated due to
technological advancement or organizational restructuring, the
employer shall have the responsibility of reassigning and retrain-
ing the employee or paying a retrenchment allowance.266
Under Article 17, retrenchment due to restructuring must
be paid to workers only if the employee cannot be retrained and
reassigned to a newjob within the enterprise. 267 With the forma-
tion of a JV, workers are being assigned to jobs within the new
enterprise. Article 17 mandates only that employees are reas-
signed in case technological advances or organizational restruc-
turing liquidate an employees position. 26 Retrenchment should
not be paid under Article 17 because workers are not being re-
trenched but remain employed.
While Articles 31 and 66 of the Labor Code make specific
allowances for the results of mergers and transfers of ownership,
they require only that a contract be honored by the new owner
and that the new owner be responsible for payment of wages and
265. See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text (discussing the retrenchment
allowance as allowance paid to employee for loss of work).
266. LABOR CODE, supra note 12, art. 17(1), at IV-107.
Where, as a result of organizational restructuring or technological changes, an
employee who has been employed in the business for a period of one or more
years becomes unemployed, the employer shall have the responsibility to re-
train and assign the employee to another job within the enterprise; if a new
job cannot be created, the employer must pay an allowance for loss of work
equivalent to the aggregate amount of one month's salary for each year of
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other rights and interests.2 69 Honoring responsibilities and ex-
isting relationships does not translate to paying termination al-
lowances to employees who continue to work in the same fac-
tory. Article 17 should be followed when a JV is formed with an
existing Vietnamese enterprise.
3. Vietnam Must Be Forthright with Investors
Disclosing risks at the beginning of the investment court-
ship will resolve the difficulties that result from ambiguities
within the law. If disclosed, investors can creatively negotiate so-
lutions to any issue. Further, disclosure allows foreign investors
to assign responsibility in the JV contract.
The desire to capture investors drives local institutions and
the SCCI not to disclose less attractive information. The SCCI
may hide negative aspects of an investment package, leading in-
vestors down ill-chosen paths.27° This practice results only in
mistrust, frustration and the potential failure ofJV's.2 71 The im-
269. Id. arts. 33, 61; see supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing how
responsibility for payment of retrenchment may be assigned to the foreign partner
under Articles 17, 33, and 61).
270. Interview with Duncan T. Pham, Partner of Pham & Associates, P.C., in Seoul
Airport, Seoul, Korea (Aug. 19, 1994). Investors in the seafood industry may not fully
understand, or be told of the "fact that higher-than-projected capital infusion is re-
quired to import more modem technology and to place the processing plants closer to
the optimum purchasing points, i.e., the docks (if they exist)." Id.
[A]li seafood exporters in Vietnam were or are state-owned entities,
formed by local government branches, and located in or close to urban areas
and away from coastal areas. Indeed, the better capitalized the enterprise, the
more centrally located it is, for example SEAPRODEX is in Ho Chi Minh City.
With the current sorry state of Vietnamese transportation and the equally
sorry state of Vietnamese refrigeration technology, it is not unusual for fish or
seafood to be less than fresh when it reaches the processing plant of the ex-
porting agency.... Consequently, Vietnamese exports are faced with higher
rejection rates by importers than comparable products from its neighbors.
Id.
271. Id.
Certainly, there has been a small number of foreign JV partners who have
opted to freeze spending in an effort to (i) pressure their Vietnamese partner
to contribute more resources, or (ii) wait for the SCCI to yank their licenses.
This halt of capital can occur at different points in time during the life of aJV:
(i) immediately after receiving the license, while compiling actual data in
Vietnamese, as opposed to working off numbers proffered by the Vietnamese
partner (ii) immediately after the central or local government (or both)
changes the laws directly or indirectly affecting theJV enterprise (iii) immedi-
ately after discovering that a crucial datum relied upon turn out to be a dud,
i.e., the number of commercial fishing vessels under contract is 5 instead of
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pulse to conceal negative information must be overcome or in-
vestors will lose faith in the SCCI as a resource and will try to
circumvent its authority.
Most investors are not discouraged by relatively low in-
creases in labor costs, if informed before signing a contract. If
higher costs are only disclosed to the investor after commitment,
the investor may feel trapped. Disclosure develops mutual trust
between JV partners in the formation of a continuing relation-
ship.
CONCLUSION
Vietnam is struggling to balance its need for foreign capital
with its strong desire to retain its national sovereignty, protect its
people and resources from exploitation, and ensure stable and
sustained growth. The Vietnamese government must not allow
local interests to upset that balance. Local interests must cede
their sovereignty concerning doi moi. The national government
must exorcise entrenched institutions from the legal system in
order to realize Vietnam's potential to become a leading eco-
nomic and cultural force in Asia.
15, or the building which will be razed to make way for a covered parking
garage for the new 3 star hotel actually belongs to some other entity not the
Vietnamese partner (iv) immediately after finding out that they have picked
the wrong partner (v) immediately after the fifth or sixth time the Vietnamese
directors have created/fomented trouble.
